

SUB-STATE ACTORS AND LEADERSHIP IN THE
EVOLUTION OF THE AFRICAN STATE

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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
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
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ABSTRACT**SUB-STATE ACTORS AND LEADERSHIP IN THE EVOLUTION OF THE AFRICAN STATE** by CPT Samba Tall, Senegal, 84 pages.

This study investigates the role of sub-state actors and leadership in the stabilization, the collapse or the renewal of the African state. Understanding the root causes of the mutations occurring in today's African states will help to build legitimacy for future Internal Security Assistance Programs and Military Operations Other Than War.

The study explains how the emergence or the empowerment of traditional, civil-society, and religious leaders loosens the states' authority, by atomizing the centers of decision. Then, to promote stability in the continent, shape a better environment, prevent conflicts or respond to crisis will always depend on how sub-state actors are managed in order to empower leadership at national level.

This thesis advocates to implement long-term strategies designed to progressively erode the influence of traditional and religious leaders while using them in focused areas and at limited levels to fulfill intermediate objectives.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In this past decade, Somalia, Liberia, and Yugoslavia collapsed and tens of others may lengthen the list of “failed states” in the close future. As these states are imploding, smaller entities are emerging, led by religious, tribal or ethnic leaders. Though, religious and traditional leaders always played a significant role in politics, there are two new aspects: these sub-state actors are increasingly challenging governments and are no longer restricted to their home state since the globalization in economy and communication is allowing them a transnational power. Also, according to Samuel Huntington in *The Clash of Civilization*, they are to play a role in the future. His thesis states that the principal future conflicts will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations.¹

This trend is emerging in a large scale in Africa and in some republics of the former Soviet Union, under the form of mafias, and in the Balkans with the former Yugoslavia being a case. Many previous works had linked those political mutations with economic problems, ineffective decolonization policies, lack of democracy, and reemergence of nationalism or tribalism. Alvin and Heidi Toffler analyzed it through their theory of waves of history.² They argue that there have been three waves in the history of humanity. Then, at any time those waves of technological changes crash in on one another, conflicts are likely to occur. As a consequence, the legitimate conclusion would be that those leaders are emerging just to fill a vacuum. However, recent history showed that many countries that have never been colonized, that are ethnically homogeneous, and

¹Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilization* (New York : Simon and Schuster, 1996), 24.

²Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler. *Creating a New Civilization* (Atlanta: Turner Pub, 1995), 17.

that have experienced some democracy or a certain degree of development are, also, on the way to
◦
break-up.

Delimitation

However, this research will be limited to Africa South of the Sahara, because these political mutations are too recent to be accurately investigated elsewhere, while they are old enough in Africa to have carried some complete transitions like in Uganda, Chad, or Ethiopia. Also, the challenge to the governments is more obvious in Africa and is no longer restricted to some “failing states.”

Hypothesis

The intended research will investigate some theses based on failure in leadership because the African cases have some common particularities:

1. There is not any purely ideological conflict in the continent.
 2. There is not any trouble purely due to economic reasons.
 3. Many political leaders relate to a religious, tribal or ethnic base.
 4. At the exception of Nigeria in 1967, never an African government defeated a guerrilla without a foreign intervention.
 5. The most important of all, in all the conflicts peacefully resolved, the influence of religious, tribal or ethnic leaders proved to be a necessary instrument.
- That correlation between collapse of African states and failure in leadership will induce many other hypotheses. Some current arguments state that many former leaders failed to adapt to a new environment while others point out a disconnection between the leaders and the African societies.

Definitions

Doctrinal or current definitions from *Webster's Dictionary* (edition 1995) are provided whenever possible. In cases where the common usage deviates from those sources, additional explanation is given.

Assimilados. From the Portuguese word assimilaos meaning integrated people mixed people descending from colonizers and African natives, and who have assimilated Portuguese culture.

Clan. A group of families claiming descent from a common ancestor.

Tribe. A tribe is a group of person or clans claiming descending from a common ancestor and living under a leader.

Ethnic. A group of people having common customs, language and characteristics.

State. An organized grouping of people within a defined territory, having a political unity, sovereignty, economic unity and playing a role in international affairs.

Transnational Actors. Due to the development of international business, many business or charity organizations and individuals are increasingly playing an important role in international politics. In this study, transnational actors refers specifically to those influential individuals.

Sub-state Actors. According to Samuel Huntington, sub-state actors are similar to transnational actors but their influence is restricted in a particular state.

Trend. A trend is the cumulative direction forces gives to the international security environment.

Force. A force is a factor that influences a nation's ability to achieve its objectives.

Failed State. A state where any kind of unity as defined in a state has disappeared.

Globalism. A policy, an outlook or a way of making business that is worldwide in scope.

Globalization. The process leading to globalism.

Humanitarian Assistance. Assistance provided by Department of Defence forces, as directed by appropriate authority, in the aftermath of natural or man-made disaster to help reduce conditions that present a serious threat to life and property (FM 100-23, Joint Pub 1-02).

Lobbying. Activities aimed to get legislators or states' executives support to certain measures or policies.

Military Operations Other Than War. Military operations other than war encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war (Joint Publication 3-07, May 1995).

Operations Other Than War. Military activities during peacetime and conflict that do not necessarily involve armed clashes between two organized forces (FM 100-23, December 1994).

Peace Operations. An umbrella term that encompasses three types of activities: activities with predominantly diplomatic lead (preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace building) and two complementary, predominantly military activities (peacekeeping and peace-enforcement) (FM 100-23, December 1994). *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, May 1995* define it: “encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace.”

Peace Enforcement. The application of military force or the threat of its use normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order (FM 100-23, December 1994).

Peacekeeping. Military operations undertaken with consent of all major parties to the dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease-fire, truce, etc.)

and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement (FM 100-23, December 1994).

Peacemaking. A process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement that arranges ends to disputes and resolves issues that led to conflict (FM 100-23, December 1994).

Context of the Problem

A survey of nearly a century of African history shows that, except the struggle for independence, there were not any basic changes in internal politics from the beginning of the colonization up to the mid-sixties. From 1963, began violent mutations like military coups and internal guerrillas. By 1997, as depicted in Table 1, two situations were dominant in Africa, South of the Sahara. On one hand, 90 percent of the internal guerrillas had succeeded in overthrowing a government. On the other hand, many presidents' rule is only due to a support from some traditional or religious leaders having much influence on their populations.

Out of fifty-two African countries, less than five have not experienced internal troubles in the past thirty years. For those who did, the three present situations may be observed: the states having completely failed, the governments overthrown by a guerrilla movement, and the countries under a status-quo. For the last category, stability is mainly due to a wide consensus between the government and some religious or traditional leaders.

Senegal and Burkina-Faso

In Senegal and Burkina-Faso, where democratic experiences are going on, a kind of balance was reached between state and religious or traditional leaders but those actors may challenge their governments in the future.

Table 1. Status of Conflicts in 1997

COUNTRY	YEAR	Status of the War
Angola	1975-1997	decreasing
Burundi	1972-1997	in activity
Cameroon	1960-1961	French intervention
Central-African Republic	1996-1997	Peacekeeping Force
Chad	1973-1990	guerrilla victory
Comores	1997	African Mediation
Congo	1997	dissidence's victory
Ethiopia-Eritrea	1962-1991	guerrilla's victory
Gambia	1981	Senegalese intervention
Guinea-Equatorial	1979	intervention of Morocco
Liberia	1989-1997	Peacekeeping force
Mali	1992-1996	Mediation of traditional leaders
Mauretania	1986-1989	intervention of Irak
Mozambique	1975-1992	UN mediation
Nigeria	1966-1967	government victory*
Niger	1991-1996	Mediation of traditional leaders
Rwanda	1990-1994	guerrilla victory
Sierra-Leone	1990-1997	military coups(in activity)
Somalia	1988-1997	in activity
Soudan	1983-1997	in activity
Uganda	1979-1986	guerrilla victory
Zaire	1997	guerrilla victory

*Nigeria is the single state having defeated a guerrilla without a direct foreign intervention.

First, in Senegal, a specific combination of historical events made it possible for the Muslim and Christian leaders to play an important role in politics during the French colonization. The colonial administration used the Christian missionaries to control all the populations along the Atlantic Ocean coast and cooperated with the conservative Muslim leaders to gain influence on a faithful population. As quoted from Lucy C. Behrman:

The French found numerous ways to make use of the marabouts. . . One typical service the marabouts, Muslim leaders in North and West Africa, performed was helping in the recruitment of soldiers and giving general support to the French

cause. Ahmad Bamba, the founder of the Murid sect, recruited four hundred Murid soldiers during the First World War. Al Hajj Malik Sy, the venerable head of the largest Wolof Tijani branch gave speeches on behalf of the French war effort.³

Then, she depicted how “the French could reward important marabouts who were cooperating with them in a various way. Obviously, they could give gifts, and political donations, expected to help keep the marabouts favorable to the French regime.”⁴ By the time the country became independent, religious leaders were ranking among the most influential citizens and the wealthiest businessmen. Then, the new authorities sought their alliance, and such a consensus established a kind of political balance up to the Eighties. However, in the past decade, the heirs of those religious leaders enrolled in politics, siding sometimes with the opposition to the government. The emergence of such a different leadership was a big challenge for the old consensus and led to some violent riots in February 1994. Also, it raised the necessity to understand the origins of that unexpected mutation.

The Republic of Burkina-Faso is another case to study carefully. By 1911 the French colonizers took away the whole power of the Moro Naba, King of the Mossis, the largest ethnic group. Between 1960 and 1986, that country experienced civilian and military regimes with the last one leaning toward Marxism. However, President-Captain Blaise Compaore used the influence of the Moro Naba to consolidate his power after a military coup in 1986. As stated by Pierre Englebert:

Political authorities in independent Upper Volta and later Burkina-Faso have continued the same mix of successive use and abuse of ethnic power but have seemed to favor the latter even more than did the French colonials. Just as in

³Lucy C Behrman, *Muslim Brotherhoods and Politics in Senegal* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 50.

⁴Ibid., 52.

colonial times, they have used the chiefs to compensate for the shortcomings of the administration, thereby reinforcing their authority.⁵

Nigeria and Cameroon

In Nigeria and South Cameroon, the British administration practiced the policy of indirect rule theorized by Lord Lugard.⁶ Thus, they interfered a little between the traditional leaders and the populations, the first ones merely playing the role of intermediaries in application of a colonial policy attempting to use African institutions to control the natives. However, in today's Nigeria ruled by a military government, the Northerner sultans are paradoxically very influential while the head of the political opposition is Chief Moshood Abiola, a wealthy traditional leader. Such a political frame is the result of the violent post-independence events that culminated with the secession war in the province of Biafra. Kenneth Post and Michael Vickers pointed out in *Structure and Conflict in Nigeria* how a "system of rewards" was institutionalized by the first federal government in order to satisfy individuals and particular groups. They demonstrated how those "policies involved the manipulation of governmental institutions, and so of the personnel who staffed them,"⁷ and set the dynamic for the collapse of the state. In the meantime, in Cameroon, the Bamileke leaders and the Muslim sultans are involved in the public affairs, the former prime minister being the Sultan of Garua's son. Those weaknesses of the state derive from the constitution negotiated as the basis for reunification of East Cameroon, formerly under French mandate and West Cameroon formerly the British mandate. As a consequence "each recognized

⁵Pierre Englebert, *Burkina-Faso* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 123.

⁶William Tordoff, *Government and Politics in Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 47.

⁷Kenneth Post and Michael Vickers, *Structure and Conflict in Nigeria* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1973), 58.

group had a portion of the power and rewards of governing, so balance in the national cabinet and within the ministries was crucial to the development of national unity.⁸ That policy, obviously, weakened the federal state. The second president of Cameroon, Paul Biya, tried to reduce the influence of the traditional leaders, but that policy was perceived as an aggression directed against the Muslims Northerners, and led to a bloody coup attempt in 1986. Then, he totally changed his policy and collaborated closely with the sultans and the Bamileke leaders, accepting to be symbolically crowned as the “Fon of Fons,” the highest traditional title in Cameroon.

Somalia and Liberia

In both states, the central government was completely atomized. These countries are still in pieces controlled each by a faction representing a clan, a tribe, or an ethnic group. Somalia is a very interesting case. It is the only African state inhabited by a single ethnic group. Though that society was divided in many clans, “living in a kind of commonwealth,”⁹ the sense of common identity was every strong, as firmly stated by Ahmed I. Samatar:

A little over thirty years ago, when Somalis , like many Africans, were enthusiastically agitating for decolonization and independence, the intensity of nationalism as a focus of a redeemed identity was unmistakable. Intertwined with the demand for the return of Ogaden (province of Ethiopia), Djibouti (French Somaliland), and the Northern Frontier District (province of Kenya)-the final reuniting of Greater Somalia-was an effusive feeling of accomplishment, solidarity, and certainty about better things to come.¹⁰

That strong feeling allowed President Siad Barre, with a nation-wide support, to wage the Ogaden War against Ethiopia in 1977. So, it will be very instructive to understand how such an

⁸Mario Azevedo, *Cameroon and Chad in Historical and Contemporary Perspective* (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1988), 92.

⁹Ahmed I Samatar, *The Somali Challenge* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), 8.

¹⁰Ibid., 95.

homogenous culture reached a point of friction to produce so many powerful leaders, in charge of that bloody interclans' war. A question painfully formulated by A. Samatar in the following interrogation:

Given the astounding distance between the early elan and the utter disconsolation of the present, why were Somalis so gleeful? How could that ebullient spirit of communitarian identity embodied in the flag (i.e., the state) turn into self-inflicted and generalized degradation?¹¹

In Liberia, the African-Americans who ruled the country for more than a century were perceived as colonizers. As quoted from Professor Amos Sawyer, the former president, "Since the early establishment of the Liberian social order, the question of settler dominance-the primacy of Liberia's settler society over the indigenous African communities-has been a central issue in Liberian society."¹² So, when Samuel Doe overthrew William Tolbert in 1980, he was acclaimed as a liberator. However, ten years later, a guerilla launched by the African-American Charles Taylor succeeded in capturing the main city after a short war. Also, why did this successful guerrilla movement break in three factions representing the main ethnic groups?

Rwanda-Uganda-Chad-Ethiopia

These four states have completed a transition, the former governments having been completely routed, but all these states are today ruled by an ethnic minority.

Rwanda captured the attention of the international community after a huge genocide in 1994, but that country was in a pernicious war for decades. During the Belgian colonization, the Tutsi minority, less than 15 percent of the population, trusted all the positions usually reserved to natives. A policy violently condemned by Gerard Prunier in his book *The Rwanda Crisis* where he

¹¹Ibid., 97.

¹²Pr. Amos Sawyer. *The Emergence of Autocracy in Liberia* (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1992), 1.

shows how “the colonial power helped to construct a tutsi identity as a superior racial type because of their distinctive ‘non-negro’ features in order to facilitate a greater control over the Rwandese.”¹³ By 1959, the Hutu majority won the elections precluding to the independence of the country. Paradoxically, after thirty-four years of a strong dictatorship they were defeated in a very short offensive , in spite of a strong foreign military support.

Uganda, also, is an instructive case of a state’s collapse. Though Uganda “was brought to independence by a coalition of disparate forces,”¹⁴ comprising political parties and traditional leaders like the King of Buganda, the struggle of independence had already created a sense of nation. The successive government ruled on a very centralized state and a federation with other East African states was seriously envisaged in 1965. However, the dynamic of collapse was set in the mid-seventies and drove the country in a turmoil for two decades. In 1979, a coalition of political parties led by Milton Obote and supported by the Tanzanian Armed Forces overthrew Idi Amin but proved unable to settle the political instability. Finally, Yoweri Museveni emerged in 1986 to seize the power after a short war.

Chad and Ethiopia are similar in a certain way. In each one of these countries, the power was held for many decades by the largest ethnic group. By 1973, a civil war began in Chad opposing mainly the Toubous and the Saras, the largest ethnic groups. That first conflict ended with the victory of the first named just to begin another one opposing the leaders of the winning party. Finally Idriss Deby emerged to bring a certain stability, though the peace is not yet completely settled. This rise of sub-state actors began under the presidency of the first president,

¹³Gerard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis* (New York: CUP, 1995), 9.

¹⁴Donald Rothchild and Michael Rogin, *Uganda in National Unity and Regionalism* (New York: CUP, 1966), 402.

Francois Tombalbaye. That one inherited a territory on the traditional line of conflict between northern Muslims and southern Pagans, but won the elections for independence with a coalition of political parties where all the religious and ethnic groups were represented. In the Horn of Africa, a comparable situation was going on. Under successive dynasties from Emperor Theodore II, crowned in 1855, the Amhara group maintained a middle-age rule on Ethiopia. Even the officers who overthrew Haile Selassie in 1974 and established a rude Marxist-Leninist regime were mostly from this ethnic group. Also, Ethiopia being the African country that has never been colonized was listed among the few existing states of the late nineteenth century. According to Robert L. Hess, the future of that empire was so promising that a French newspaper declared in 1896: "all European countries will be obliged to make a place for this new brother who steps forth ready to play in the dark continent the role of Japan in the Far East."¹⁵ However, up to now, the mystery remains on how a small guerrilla faction emerged to defeat a 500,000 manned army strongly supported by the former Soviet Union and a large Cuban expeditionary force. Edmond J. Keller chronicles that support in Revolutionary Ethiopia:

The Soviet Union landed a huge air and sealift of arms and materials intended for Ethiopia. In a very short time more than 1\$ billion of military equipment were pumped into Ethiopia. In the next several months more than eleven thousand Cuban and one thousand Soviet military personal arrived in the country.¹⁶

In short, both in Ethiopia and in Chad, a leader from a minority emerged to rule a state with numerous antagonist ethnic groups, after having defeated the largest one.

¹⁵Robert L Hess, *Ethiopia in National Unity and Regionalism* (New York: CUP, 1966), 461.

¹⁶Edmond J Keller, *Revolutionary Ethiopia* (Bloomingdale: Indiana University Press, 1988), 206.

Angola, Central African Republic and Congo

Besides Angola, Central-African Republic and Congo are still in an open war that may last for a long time because their warring factions represent each 30 to 40% of the total populations.

Angola is a particular case since it was seen as the typical war by proxy opposing communists to the free world. After the collapse of communism, this conflict is showing its real nature: an opposition between African natives and mixed people named Assimilados. The war for independence from Portugal was initiated in 1960 by urban intellectuals and some liberal whites who founded the MPLA in the mid-fifties. By 1965, Holden Roberto left the pro-marxist MPLA to found his own Pro-western party, the FNLA. A few years later, Jonas Savimbi backed by his Ovambo ethnic group founded the UNITA after accusing the MPLA, led by President Agostinho Neto, of ostracism toward native Africans. William Tordoff explains:

Neto was confronted three years later with a plot to topple him mounted by Nino Alves, a former guerrilla commander and Minister of Internal Administration. Alves and his fellow dissidents, who included respected MPLA militants, disliked the president's policy of non-racialism and resented the influence wielded in post independent Angola by mesticos and a number of whites.¹⁷

However, the three parties remained allies in fighting the colonial administration up to the independence in 1975. So, the interest of this case, that can be extended to all the former Portuguese colonies, is to understand why those former leaders failed to achieve the level of integration reached in all the countries that had to fight hard for their independence.

The Congo and the Central-African Republic conflicts have a common nature. In these two states, a president democratically elected is facing his predecessors in an open war, with each side representing an ethnic group. Both experienced successive civilian and military governments

¹⁷William Tordoff, *Government and Politics in Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 40.

for more than thirty years, but anyone of this kind of regime did not succeed in settling the ethnical or tribal antagonisms. Those situations may be linked to the legacy of French colonialism. As pointed by John A. Ballard, "there was no African middle class of any importance in French Equatorial Africa in 1960."¹⁸ The economy was based in exploiting the forests' resources and no effort was made to educate people or to govern them adequately, since those countries were run by agents appointed by commercial companies. However, those countries became independent with many advantages over the rest of Africa. They had small populations, and huge and diversified resources in raw materials, but failed to create any sense of nation. Today, they are engaged in fratricide conflicts supported by national and international private interests. A similar case but bigger in scale is the Democratic Republic of Congo, former Zaire. As depicted by Steven Metz of the US Army War College in 1996, Zaire was a school case in studying regional security environment:

Zaire is potentially rich. It has large reserves of mineral. It's the Sub-Saharan Africa's third most popular state and one of the largest, sharing borders with nine other countries. Given Zaire's potential to either lead regional development or drag the process down . . . The US Army should actively seek to augment its understanding of reform, crisis and security in Zaire.¹⁹

Nevertheless, despite all its potentialities added to the attention from the international community, that country was in the edges of disaster for many years. The political life was dominated by General Mobutu backed up by a multitude of family clans and private interest groups. The state was almost atomized and many officials were running state offices or counties like a private business. As a consequence, a small army led by Laurent Kabilia routed the army in

¹⁸John A Ballard, *Four Equatorial States in National Unity and Regionalism* (New York: CUP, 1966), 235.

¹⁹Steven Metz, *Reform, Conflict and Security in Zaire* (Carlisle Barracks: SSI, 1996), 2-3.

a six-month war, launched more than two thousand miles East of the capital city. This case is a pure demonstration of the role sub-state actors may play in the collapse or the renewal of a state: a group of citizens emerging to maintain the unity of a state in the way to face secession.

In short, wherever a guerrilla succeeded in overthrowing a government, a political stability reached by consensus, the war settled peacefully or still going on, sub-state actors are playing a increasing role in African politics. A fact, also, illustrated by the abdication of strong military dictatorships, in Benin and Madagascar, after violent civil rights demonstrations.

Transnational Actors

Moreover, some of these new actors have a transnational influence since a significant number of religious and ethnic groups spread in many countries may follow the same leader. Thus, the Amenokal of Tuaregs is influential in Northern Mali, Northern Niger and South of Algeria. While the heirs of the Muslim conqueror of the nineteenth century, El Hadj Omar Tall, are respected authorities all around West Africa, and have disciples in the Fulani community spread from Senegal to North Cameroon. The same phenomena may be observed for the Haussas in the area encompassing Niger, Mali, Nigeria and North of Ivory Coast. Also, the Tutsi community all around Rwanda and Burundi are more and more relating to some Rwandese authorities. In the meantime, the religious leaders are involved in the same manner. Muslims Qadriya, Tijania and Orthodox imams have disciples spread from Mauretania to Somalia while Christian Methodists priests are influential in the area from Liberia to South of Cameroon.

Significance of the Study

This particular trend, having diverse implications on the future of the African state, raises the question to understand how such actors have succeeded in influencing or controlling the power in countries having experienced the notion of modern state for nearly one half a century. This study

in a wide and heterogeneous area may contribute to solve some current and future conflicts. Also, it may expand the theoretical bases used in applying decision-making process to some particular situations arising worldwide in the post-Cold War environment. Additionally, such a knowledge could be used in the full scope of operations other than war. Peacekeeping, peace building, humanitarian assistance and preservation of natural resources may require it to know who are the most important individuals with whom to talk. In peace enforcement, it may help to determine who are the leaders of opinion and how to influence their decision-making.

Though this study focuses on some precise African countries where the balance is broken or where complete transitions took place, it will cover all the area South of the Sahara with a worldwide projection since many similarities exist between the different cultures and political regimes, as demonstrated by Samuel Huntington in *Political Order in Changing Societies*.²⁰

Research Design

Studying political mutations in Africa South of the Sahara remains a complex task because that area, unlike the rest of the world, experienced an extremely fast historical evolution. Most of its societies had to move from a middle-age era to the Twentieth Century in less than two decades. Thus, to understand why sub-state actors are emerging in a so high rate supposes to determine whether the collapse of African states reveals a failure to govern with modern political institutions or an incapacity to build such tools since both cases are failure in leadership. So, this study will, at first, survey all the states where relevant political mutations occurred in order to categorize them. This categorization should come out with two groups: the states where former governments weakened or destroyed existing political institutions and the states where a modern political frame

²⁰Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (Massachusetts: Colonial Press Inc, 1968), 47.

was never rooted in. In the third step, the investigations will be focused on identifying what social, economic or political factors were decisive in the emergence of sub-state actors. Then these two categories will be compared in order to identify the relevant patterns of the trend and to select a sample-state for each pattern. Finally, identifying governments' policies that originated the decisive crisis and analyzing the decision-making process throughout the principles of leadership's scope should show the role governments played in the building of the factors leading to the emergence of sub-state actors in African politics.

Selecting the Method

Studying political mutations in Africa South of the Sahara remains a complex task, for three main reasons. At first, it supposes to give a sound answer to a perennial question in political sciences: do cultures shape politics, do politics shape cultures or is there a two-way causality? Whatever it would be, the answer will be hardly satisfying because there is not a single African culture neither a state with an homogenous culture. Second, that continent is still experiencing a fast historical evolution. Politically and economically, Africa is trying to accomplish in five decades what was done elsewhere in centuries. Third, due to the growing world interdependence, few trends are predictable in Africa since any enterprise developed there is under heavy international pressures and influences.

Then, to understand why and how sub-state actors are emerging supposed to find either a common denominator or some recurrent patterns and establish their links with other internal or external factors. Thus, a comparative method is the more accurate one to find out those possible similarities and interrelations; this research uses a survey method to gather facts from the available literature and media broadcasts while the analysis uses various models developed to theorize state-

society relations in Africa. Then, the process followed is the helical concept of research developed by Paul D. Leedy²¹.

Evaluating the Methods

Since the research intends to verify some hypothesis in order to determine the possible trends, it is imperative to evaluate the potential of bias.

The first considered method of investigation was the comparison within two families of facts. The modes of transmission of power and the kinds of leadership experienced in the African states from the nineteenth century up to 1997. That comparison was based on pure facts analyzed throughout the frame of the democratic tricephalous (executive, legislative, judicial) state.

A complementary means of investigation considered was to conduct personal interviews with the African officers at Fort Leavenworth. This technique will be abandoned, after many informal discussions with the targeted population, for two main reasons:

1. The limited number of persons to be interviewed.
2. The lack of objectivity due to a great involvement in one of the conflicting parties in their countries.

Information Collection

The objective of the survey is to collect pure facts relating the different transfers of power (elections, coups d'etat, civil wars, appointments) that occurred in Africa South of the Sahara. The era to be surveyed goes from the nineteenth century up to 1997, the focus being on the post-colonial period.

²¹Paul D. Leedy, *Practical Research*, 4th ed. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1989), P9.




Figure 1. Research process cycle: Helical Concept.

Evaluating the facts

To reduce the potential of misinterpretation, only the facts collected from sources expressing divergent opinions or known to have opposite political views will be selected. Also, to safeguard objectivity, any fact to be used in this research should have been reported both by native and foreign sources.

Location of the Information

The sources for collecting information are the authoritative periodicals and magazines published in English or French, the broadcasting recorded and translated by the US Foreign Bureau of Information Services (FBIS), the past scholarly works on Africa providing a cultural or historical frame of reference, and the authoritative literature expressing theoretical positions in political and social sciences. Most of those sources are available in the Combined Arms Research Library at Fort Leavenworth or from its interlibrary loan program. The remaining ones can be obtained from the "Institut Fondamental d'Afrique Noire" in Senegal and from the "Institut Francais des Relations Internationales," both accessible through Internet.

Means of Obtaining the Information

The facts to be collected are, mostly, in open sources and have been reported many times in the media and analyzed in authoritative works. Additionally, many monographs and studies can be retrieved from archives through Internet.

Application of the Method

The methodology incorporates a four-step approach to investigate the emergence of sub-state actors in African politics: (1) a survey of all the states where relevant political mutations occurred and a comparison of those mutations to identify the relevant patterns; (2) an identification of the critical factors sustaining those patterns; (3) a comparison of those factors across the area of

study; and (4) a study of those factors' impact in the interrelationship government-society. The following are specific details of each step of that approach:

Survey and compare all the states where relevant political mutations occurred to identify the relevant patterns. Categorize the states having common patterns. Then, select a sample-state for each category.

1. Within each one of those states, identify what cultural, economic or political factors were decisive in the governments' decision-making process and in the society's response.
2. Compare those factors to determine whether they are recurrent and applicable to the entire area of study.

3. Study that interrelationship government-society throughout the principles of leadership's scope to identify what structures the trend. That study borrows both to many models developed to characterize the interactions state-society, particularly in Africa, and to the concept of multi-centric world theorized by James Rosenau.²²

Milestones

The four steps of this research were conducted from August 1997 to April 1998. The survey of the area of study was planned from August to October 1997. The literature review, from November to December 1997, focusing mainly on the recent literature in Africa and the aim being to identify the critical factors listed in the second step of the research methodology. The analysis of the patterns and the interrelationship study were conducted through January and February 1998. The final statement outline and the conclusion were drafted in the beginning of March 1998 and reviewed on April 1998.

²²James N. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), 18.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

A large collection of literature was already dedicated to addressing or explaining the political mutations occurring in Africa South of the Sahara. However, most of the works use the historical frame to explain the emergence of sub-state actors and consequently link the new trend with tribalism and religion. This literature review focuses on works that explain or address the trend as a current fact having its roots in the present or historic environment. These works fall in three categories: the authoritative literature in political and social sciences, the current media publications, such as periodicals and broadcastings. Also, the scholarly works like monographs and strategic studies are reviewed.

Mainly, the review points out that sub-state actors are emerging in the African countries where the state is progressively weakening. These political mutations combine to originate some recurrent factors. The four patterns are the inability of governments to adapt to a new domestic or international environment, the disconnection between the political leaders and the society, the colonial legacy and corruption.

Inability to adapt to a new environment

Due to the increasing level of education, the large flow of information and the progressive interdependence of economies, people have more aspirations but are less willing to rely on the state since recent history demonstrated the limits of political entities in satisfying everyone's needs, the collapse of communism being an example. So, citizens are more and more concerned with their future and their will is expressed individually or collectively across the whole spectrum of social activities. Thus, many governments, in developing countries and particularly in Africa, that are slow or unable to adapt to this new environment are challenged by those arising social forces.

Political Order in Changing Society by Samuel Huntington.

In studying political mutations in the developing countries, Samuel Huntington analyzed thoroughly the causes of instability in newly independent African countries. He concluded that they were originated by rapid social changes and irruption of new actors into politics coupled with the slow building of political institutions.²³ In developing that thesis, he pointed out what new social, economical, and political factors created a favorable environment for the emergence of sub-state actors wherever the political authorities were slow or unable to acknowledge that a new situation was developing. Also, he argued that “social and economical modernization disrupted old patterns of authority and destroyed traditional political institutions.”²⁴ Then in trying to “bridge the increasing gap”²⁵ between the rapidly modernizing urban areas and the rural ones, political leaders facilitated the entry into politics of traditional and religious leaders while the business class forced its way into the new institutions. Additionally, he underlined the arising corruption and the progressive compromises of African leaders who were abandoning or modifying some modern values as a price for rural support.

Enjeux de Sens et de Puissance au XXI Siecle by Zaki Laidi.

Zaki Laidi explains the new political mutations as a “crisis of centrality”²⁶ based on three phenomena: the decentralization of wealth, the dissemination of authority, and the fragmentation of the notion of power. First, he explains how the distribution of the world’s wealth is changing.

²³Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (Massachusetts: Colonial Press Inc., 1968), 4.

²⁴Ibid., 39.

²⁵Ibid., 72.

²⁶Zaki Laidi, *Sens et Puissance dans les Relations Internationales* (Paris: Edition Fayard, 1995), 40-45.

More and more parts are shifting from the Western countries to the other continents. Then, he shows how these changes are producing reactions in the areas not benefiting from that economic mutation. Second, he demonstrates that all the social, political, economic or cultural institutions hierarchically organized are in crisis. These institutions range from states, large religious groups to business corporations. Due to the large flow of information and to the increasing level of education, people are less and less willing to accept any “truth coming from the top.”²⁷ Third, the notion of power is changing. It is more and more a balance of wealth, military power, access to information, and use of influence. In conclusion, he argues that any state failing to anticipate those mutations will likely face a deep crisis of authority and legitimacy.

One can note that his point of view is in accordance with the subhypothesis based on the failure of some African leaders to adapt to a new environment.

Les Menaces du XXI Siecle by Burhan Ghalioun

In this issue, were published many articles from a seminar on regional security held in Paris in 1996. For Burhan Ghalioun,²⁸ the emergence of sub-state actors is the result of two imperatives: the necessity for African states to participate in the building world market and the preservation of their internal social cohesion. Then, he identifies four factors to support his hypothesis: internal and international politics, social and culture. On one hand, to survive, Sub-Saharan states have to follow the conditions of the world market and by the way try to implement policies that are not in accordance with their people’s aspirations. Also, some civil servants losing their privileges after the denationalization of many corporations tend to contest the new political order. Then, they raise tribal or religious sentiments to gain a support from common citizens. On

²⁷Ibid., 34-37.

²⁸Burhan Ghalioun, “Les Menaces du XXI Siecle,” *Revue Defense Nationale* (April 1996): 40.

the other hand, due to the new organization of the world of the economy and the large privatization, African countries cannot afford any kind of welfare state. As a consequence, the gap is widening between the elite and the rest of the population. The concept of nation is challenged and the state is progressively atomized in political, tribal, and religious entities. In the meantime, there is a huge cultural gap in these countries. While some people have access to information and live by Western standards, the vast majority living in suburban areas is losing its cultural references. So, the trend is to adopt violence as a mean of expression or find a new identity in new social groups like sects or confraternities.

The social contract put to test by Bouziane Ahmed Khodja

An Algerian journalist Bouziane Ahmed Khodja discussed the role of religious brotherhoods in Senegal. According to him, “Muslim brotherhood play an important role in that they provide an effective link between the government and the society, where disciples place a high trust on their spiritual guide.”²⁹ He demonstrated how successive governments obtained votes in national elections among other services, in exchanges of rewards for religious leaders. However, he pointed out how “this social contract is put to test”³⁰ by the brotherhoods leaders who are asking for more and more rewards, while the citizens are asking for more democracy and a better life in a environment characterized by an increasing scarcity of resources.

The Coming Anarchy by Robert Kaplan

In Robert Kaplan’s view, the emergence of sub-state actors will remain a durable trend in the developing countries due to a tremendous growth of their population. Analyzing the situation

²⁹Bouziane Ahmed Khodja, *Le Soir d’Algérie*. Sept 92, Foreign Broadcasting Information Services, 22 October 1992. Microfilm AFR-92-205.

³⁰Ibid., 1.

in Africa, he states that mass migration, aggression against the environment, decrease of resources and the spread of diseases will weaken the authority of governments over the hinterlands and the suburban areas. As a consequence, we will see a transition from the nation-state to a “pattern of city-states, shanty-states, nebulous and anarchic regionalisms.”³¹ In his view, “wars will be sub-national, meaning that it will be hard for states and local governments to protect their own citizens physically.”³² Then, the exercise of power will shift gradually from the state to individuals or groupings of citizens.

Though, none of these reviewed works did specifically address leadership, all of them identified some shortfalls in the application of its principles. The lack of vision and flexibility are underlined as the main factors hindering the ability of governments to adapt to this new environment.

Disconnection between the Ruling Class and the Society

During the two decades following the independence, more than 80% of the population of Africa were totally illiterate, were living in rural or poor urban areas and had distant connections with the world. In the meantime, there was a small ruling elite living according to western standards. There was a huge, cultural gap between those two classes and it was very difficult to implement policies based on western cultural references. So, traditional and religious leaders were drawn into politics to serve as intermediaries. Then, they progressively turned to an important lobbying force and later to active players wherever the political institutions were weak.

³¹Robert Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy,” *The Atlantic Monthly*, February 1994, 48.

³²Ibid., 45.

Nation Building in Africa by Arnold Rivkin

According to Arnold Rivkin, most of the African leaders were unable to dissolve the different social entities in the nation-state. Their educational background and their ideological references are generally far different from their people's cultural frame of reference. As he states:

Urban party leaders are often unable psychologically to reach out for rural support. If they are to do successfully, they may have to modify drastically or to suppress their own modern values or goals and to adopt the more traditional stance which appeals to the countryside.³³

This reliance on rural and traditional leaders brought many new actors on the political arena in the beginning of the nineties, when the collapse of the Communism opened new windows for democracy in Africa.

War and Anti-War by Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler

According to Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler, there have been three waves in the history of humanity. The first wave being the period where primitive tribal nomadic groups were replaced by farmers, the second one being the transition to the industrial revolution and the third one being nowadays information era.³⁴ In their theory, at any time those waves of technological changes crash in one against the following one, conflicts are likely to occur.³⁵ Though they classify Africa in their First Wave's countries, one can note that all those three waves are present in that continent at the same time; a "clash of civilizations" is going on between the westernized elites, the emerging middle classes and the rural masses.

³³Arnold Rivkin, *Nation Building in Africa* (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1969), 53.

³⁴Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti-War* (New York: Little Brown, 1993), 19.

³⁵Ibid., 21.

Government and Power in West Africa by Robert Jordan

Robert Jordan demonstrated how the caste system played a significant role in the new trend. He explains:

The high status of war-making is shown by the fact that were a caste system existed in an African tribe, as among the Wolofs of Senegambia or the Fulanis, the warrior caste was at the top of the hierarchy.³⁶

Then, he aptly summarized the risk introduced in focusing on historical references in the actual political life. Such attempts to legitimize governments proved to be a double-edged sword. Those who acted on that way, being mostly educated out of the African cultural schemes, were not aware of the will of the traditional leaders to regain their lost feudal privileges and gave them a new legitimacy.

Les Elites Politiques Indexes by Alassane Cisse

During a seminar on the current situation in Africa South of the Sahara, held in Senegal on November 1997, many African scholars pointed out that the political elite bear responsibility in the collapse of political institutions. A famous Senegalese psychologist argued that “African governments doesn’t care about the worries of their populations. They don’t sought for the public opinion and design solutions without any grip with today’s reality.”³⁷ While the Congolese writer Axelle Kabou and the Senegalese Minister in charge of Arts and Culture emphasized on “the gap between some traditional values and the current modern world realities.”³⁸

³⁶Robert Jordan, *Government and Power in West Africa* (New York: African Publishing Corp, 1969), 120.

³⁷Serigne Mor Mbaye, “Quoted by Alassane Cisse,” *Sud-Quotidien* (Dakar) 19 November 1997), 3.

³⁸Axelle Kabou, *Et si l’Afrique refusait le développement* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992), 38.

In short, this reviewed literature outlines how the reliance on intermediaries without any background in modern democracy can damage political institutions. Such a damage can be observed in all the states where the support of traditional or religious leaders was obtained in exchange of many compromises from the governments

The Colonial Legacy

It seems irrelevant to relate political mutations occurring more than thirty years after the independence with the colonial legacy. However, one have to remember that many African countries went independent without any significant economy and with less than one hundred people having completed high school. As a consequence, modern political institutions were never rooted in most of the states. Their survivability was only due to a massive support from European powers rivalizing in the Cold War environment.

African Politics by Donald L. Gordon

In a monograph published in the second edition of *Understanding Contemporary Africa*, Donald Gordon highlighted the impact of colonial legacy in the changes we are now observing in the politics of Africa. He demonstrated how the inheritance of colonial behaviors shaped the first generation of leaders who, in turn, implemented policies leading toward the disintegration of their states.

In his view, the geography and the political structures were designed “to fit economic and political strategies of European countries.”³⁹ So, to provide raw materials and opportunities for European markets, oriented colonies were created, dividing Africa in cash-cropping areas, reservoirs of labor migrants, mining colonies and white immigrants settlements. As a consequence,

³⁹Donald L. Gordon and April A. Gordon, *Understanding Contemporary Africa* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), 59.

there was no potential for nation-building, economic development and stability because the artificial boundaries separated cohesive social groups and divided logical trading areas. Also, authoritarian political structures backed by native police forces and colonial troops, were set to implement the exploitation of these colonies.

At the independence, due to the discrimination in colonial education policies, many African countries had not enough educated people to staff either the agencies of the government or the private business. Also, the leaders for the independence were mostly traders and low-level civil servants. Most of the national and local leaders were charismatic and fluent speakers from the labor associations, rather than well-educated people. Then, the mobilization of population in political parties came from the top rather from the desire of citizens to be represented and many people were drawn into these organizations by promises of rewards after the independence.⁴⁰

Another determinant inheritance is well pointed out by Donald Cordon:

Future African leaders, continuously exposed to the milieu of authoritarian control, were accustomed to government justified on the basis of force. The idea that government was above self-interested political activities(which only served to subvert the public's welfare) was communicated by colonial administrators.⁴¹

Also, he explains how the transfer of power will play an important role in the future of the African state: “to retain as much political and especially economic control as possible, colonial administration maneuvered to exclude elements of the nationalist movements perceived to be dangerous and to aid leaders and parties friendly to European economic interests.”⁴²

⁴⁰Donald L. Gordon and April A. Gordon, *Understanding Contemporary Africa* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), 59.

⁴¹Ibid., 79.

⁴²Ibid., 83.

Those inheritances coupled with a quick transition promoted to power leaders who were not educated, excepted in a few countries, and who had never experienced any kind of management. Then, the first African governments centralized the state power within a single political party or a personal rule, based on rewards and coercion. Such policies will have a negative impact on weak economies. The administrative branch and the state-owned corporations used as funding and job agencies to reward supporters went in a huge bankruptcy. Also, growing military or police forces and luxurious expenditures without any economical interests were a burden for small African economies.

As a consequence, in the late Eighties most of the states proved unable to provide basic needs such as education health or security to population. According to Donald Gordon, many citizens disengaged from the state and the governments began facing a resurgence and expansion of voluntary organizations,⁴³ then autonomous centers of power.

Aux Origines des conflicts dans les zones Touaregues et Maures by Pierre Boilley

In a study investigating the conflicts in the Tuaregs and Moors areas, Pierre Boilley explains the trend as the renewal of a cultural identity. Faced with a strong resistance during the colonial conquest, the French implemented in this area, encompassing Southern Algeria, Western Sahara, North of Mali, Niger, Burkina-Faso and Mauritania, a very repressive administration. So, there were little investment in education and economy. Naturally, "Tuaregs and Moors found themselves excluded from the political and economical life when these African countries went

⁴³Ibid., 85.

independent.”⁴⁴ Then, most of them emigrated to Libya where they served as mercenaries in the Colonel Qaddafi’s Islamic Legion.

In the late eighties, politically educated, and military trained; they founded many armed factions and resumed war against Mali and Niger. The Tuaregs cultural identity being the cement of these numerous factions, many traditional leaders gained influence and became important actors in the political life since the peace accords signed in 1996.

Le Tchad, un Etat à Reinventer? France Henry-Labordere

In an analysis of the role of tribal faction in the political life in Chad, France Henry-Labordere of University Paris I explained their emergence. In her view, they are “inheritances of both the French colonization and the rivalry between regional powers like Libya and Nigeria or the past competition among France, USA, and former Soviet Union.”⁴⁵

As she explains, France emphasized in the cultural and religious diversity to implement its colonial policy while Libya and Nigeria were interested in some border areas rich in minerals. Also, she pointed out how USA became involved due to the strategy of containment against former Soviet Union and his then ally Libya.

As a consequence, those external actors are still supporting a religious or a tribal faction. From 1990, most of the factions converted themselves to political parties but are not yet willing to compel to strict democratic rules, and are by the way challengers to the central government

⁴⁴Pierre Boilley, “Aux Origines des Conflicts dans les Zones Touaregs et Maures,” *Revue Relations Internationales et Stratégiques* (Paris), 23 (Autumn 1996): 100-107.

⁴⁵France Henry-Labordere, “Le Tchad? Un Etat à Reinventer?” *Revue Relations Internationales et Stratégiques* (Paris), no.23 (Autumn 1996): 121-122.

The Lumpen Proletariat and the Lumpen Militariat by Ali Mazroui.

Explaining what role military dictatorships played in the renewal of tribalism and ethnicity, Ali Mazroui highlighted the inheritance of colonialism. In his thesis, as a legacy of the colonial rule, the African armed forces were mostly from the poor classes of the society and from the minority groups.⁴⁶ As a consequence, many military regimes tried to stay in power by developing a policy of nepotism centered on tribe or ethnic group. Thus, “despite their assertions, many military men aimed, not at the modernization but at the retribalization or retraditionalization of the society (as in Uganda coup in 1971 or in Zaire where Mobutu initiated a policy so-called authentication).”⁴⁷

Though, these works emphasized the role of colonial legacy in the collapse of the states, they also pointed out the responsibility of Africans in handling this legacy. In their view, many governments avoided deep reforms and developed some instruments inherited from the repressive colonial administration to consolidate their power, developing a gradual popular resistance that is reaching its heights now.

Corruption

This literature review lists corruption among the main causes of both the collapse of states and the emergence of sub-state actors. The development of practices like bribery loosens the authority of the judiciary institutions while the corruption of moral values reinforces the influence of traditional and religious leaders.

⁴⁶Ali Mazroui, “The Lumpen Proletariat and the Lumpen Militariat: African Soldiers as new political class,” *Political Studies*, Vol. 21 (March 1973): 1-12.

⁴⁷Ibid., 6.

Les Economies de Guerre by Jean Christopher Rufin

In Jean Christopher Rufin's view, the "criminalization of the economy"⁴⁸ is also a basic factor in the emergence of sub-state actors. In some African countries, the weakness of the administration generated many illegal practices and loosened the control of the state in many remote areas. As a consequence, these communities in trying to survive developed progressively an autonomous economy and further established their own commercial links with legal or illegal multinational corporations, depending of their natural resources. Then the major economic actors, individuals or collectivities, tend to turn as political leaders challenging the central government.

A dictator returns. Patrick Smith

In the issue of October 97, Africa Confidential aptly summarized how many a new type of sub-state actors are emerging. The elected President of Congo Pascal Lissouba appointed many officials from his ethnic group and founded his private militia to consolidate his power. Then he hired French, Israeli instructors to train these tribal troops financed by multinational corporations.⁴⁹ Also, private corporations paid for combat helicopters bought from Ukraine and flew with Russian mercenary pilots. Strongly backed by the president's ethnic group, his private militias resumed war in June 1997 to eliminate his predecessor's militias that were supported by their ethnic group and other private interests.

In fact this war won by General Sassou Ngessou's militias was waged by a conglomerate of private interests ranging from tribal groups, mercenaries to multinational corporations. As a

⁴⁸Jean Christopher Rufin, "Les Economies de Guerre," *Defense Nationale* (Paris), no.1 (1996): 7-13.

⁴⁹Patrick Smith, "A dictator returns," *Africa Confidential* (London) 29 October 1997, 4.

consequence, all these sub-state actors will emerge in a close future to share the benefits, adding new autonomous centers of power in the African political arena.

Rwanda: Les Errances de la Gestion d'un Conflict by Antoine Jouan

Analyzing the conflict in Rwanda, Antoine Jouan of Fondation Medecins sans Frontieres demonstrated how the corruption of the government led by the late President Habyarimana facilitated the emergence of sub-state actors both outside and within the state's institutions.⁵⁰

First, to consolidate his power, he emphasized on the differences between the ruling Hutu majority and the Tutsi minority. Then developing a sentiment of exclusion that resulted in the formation of the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) led by exiled Tutsis. Second, General Habyarimana appointed his close family members in the most important state-owned and private business corporations while turning the army and the administration to job providers for the members of his region. So, the others members of his own Hutu ethnic group turned to a strong internal political opposition. As a consequence in 1993, the Rwandese political life was split in four antagonists poles, all challenging the state: a government ready to sign the peace with the armed opposition, the pro-tutsi Rwandese patriotic front, the pro-hutu internal opposition and the President's family in laws trying to safeguard its privileges.

Power in Africa by Patrick Chabal

Analyzing the reproduction of power in Africa, Patrick Chabal compared the new trend to a sanction of the civil society against governments holding power for a too long period, two to three decades in some cases. As he stated: "one of the chief reasons for potential or actual political instability in Africa lies in the attempt by younger competitors to remove the seemingly immovable

⁵⁰ Antoine Jouan, "Rwanda: Les Errances de la Gestion d'un Conflict," *Revue Relations Internationales et Strategiques* (Paris) 23 (Autumn 1996): 132-156.

leaders who thus monopolies power.”⁵¹ He added that another cause is the struggle for accumulation of wealth in patrimonial states where the “private and public overlap, thus allowing private gain from public office.”⁵² Then, as he summarized, state power is savagely contested because it brings with it one of the only guaranteed sources of revenues.⁵³

Le Retour des Pretoriens by Francis Kpatinde

Analyzing the comeback of military regimes, after the large process's of democratization that took place from 1989 to 1991, the journalist Francis Kpatinde states:

The ease with which African armies are ending democratic experiences illustrates the failure of some elected presidents and their inability, after many years at the head of the state, to satisfy the basic needs of the populations and to firmly fix democracy in the minds. Coups d'Etat flourish in a fruitful compost made of politicians' quarrels, intolerance, rigged elections or constitutions and endemic poverty.⁵⁴

Quoting a senator from Mali, Tiebile Drame, he added: “In many cases the civilian elites misused democracy in humiliating people or changing the rules at the dawn of elections.”⁵⁵ In agreement with many African scholars, he assumes that corruption and authoritarianism are originating the reemergence of military powers or other sub-state forces.

⁵¹Patrick Chabal, *Power in Africa* (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1994), 255-256.

⁵²Ibid., 258.

⁵³Ibid., 259.

⁵⁴Francis Kpatinde, “Le Retour des Pretoriens,” *Revue Jeune Afrique(Paris)* 11-17 November 1997, 27.

⁵⁵Ibid., 28.

To sum up, these works demonstrated how the use of public office to gain influence or accumulate wealth impeded the state building in Africa. Also, this literature review pointed how government policies based on corruption and compromise can develop challenging powers within the society.

CHAPTER III

INSTITUTIONAL AND SOCIAL MAPPING

The following study investigates the interrelationship between the government and the society to determine how sub-state actors are generated or empowered in Africa South of the Sahara. First, a survey of all the countries where relevant mutations occurred will allow one to compare the evolution of the political institutions, from independence to the present. Those states will then be categorized according to their common characteristics. Second, a sample state will be selected for each category to identify what cultural, economic, or social factors were determinant in the government-society interactions. The analysis borrows to many models designed to theorize the interactions between state and society, and to the MOOTW analysis process developed at the US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC).⁵⁶

Categorizing States

The reference used to categorize the following African states is the democratic modern state, with many competing political parties, and effective checks and balances between the executive, the legislative and the judicial branches. The survey and the comparison of the states in Africa South of the Sahara identifies, as depicted from table 2 to 5, four main categories of state: (1) the states where that type of modern political frame was never rooted; (2) the states where former governments destroyed emerging democratic political institutions; (3) the states where the political institutions came close to that model but remained imperfect copies; and (4) the states coming from one of those categories but where a democratic regime is emerging after fair elections were held.

⁵⁶U.S. Army, CGSC, DJMO. *Fundamentals of Operational Warfighting*. Fort Leavenworth: CGSC, 1997.

In the first category (table 2), are found the states that became independent after a war of liberation or those where the colonizers were forced to leave in a hurry after heavy international pressures. Many factors prevented the emergence of democratic institutions in those states, like in the former monarchies under protectorate. Those factors include a lack of education for the majority of the population and shortages in political awareness due to colonial policies that never fully integrated natives into the political life. Also, most of these states started without any preparation provided by the former colonial puissance because the ties were severed violently or in a hurry. All the former Portuguese colonies experienced an independence war due to a harsh colonial policy and to the reluctance of Portugal to grant them any form of autonomy. Due to internal and external pressures, the Portuguese colonial empire collapsed in 1975 leaving those countries with a destroyed infrastructure and a very low level of education: Cabo-Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Sao-Tome fell under a militaro-marxist dictator inherited from the leading guerrilla party while Angola and Mozambique went into a long civil war. The same year, due to increasing pressures from the international community, the former Spanish colony of Equatorial-Guinea and the remaining French colonies, Djibouti and Comores, were granted a hurried independence. As a consequence, those three countries went immediately into the personal rule of their most influential political leader. Also, in that category, Malawi and the former French Guinea started identically and went under similar destinies: both acceded to international sovereignty, in a hurry, before their neighbors because the movement for independence was headed by a very popular and charismatic leader; both ended in a dictatorship for three decades because Kamuzu Banda and Sekou Toure, their respective leaders, were able to take advantage of their charisma because of the prevailing low level of education. Jackson and Rosberg summarized how President Banda steadily elevated his status and power while subordinating those around him. As they explain, such a

domination was possible because his leadership was sought by young nationalists who had influence on an uneducated population dreaming for independence:

President Banda's political domination of Malawi is due in no small or coincidental way to his remarkable life Odyssey. . . .He returned to Malawi in 1958, after forty years of exile in England and United States, at the invitation of local nationalists who wanted him to assume the leadership of their independence movement. He quickly eclipsed these much younger and less wordly leaders and became the dominant figure in Malawi politics. . . .Dr Banda is the state.⁵⁷

The monarchies of Lesotho and Swaziland fall under this first category like Ethiopia, where the empire of Haile Selassie was replaced by a militaro-marxist dictatorship that ended to be overthrown by a guerilla coalition. Liberia, also falls in this first category a minority, living under modern democratic standards, kept the majority of the population under an almost colonial rule for many years.

To summarize, the states in the first category are the following ones: the monarchies and the oligarchies ruled by an ethnic minority, those where the colonial powers left after a war of independence or were forced to leave in a hurry by domestic and external factors. In all those countries, there was not any previous democratic culture, the level of education was low and the power has handed to a guerilla movement or a single influential political leader. Consequently, none of these have not yet fostered democratic institutions.

⁵⁷Robert Jackson and Carl J. Rosberg, "Autocrats and Lordship," *Personal Rule in Black Africa* (Berkeley: UCLA Press, 1982), 160-161.

Table 2. First Category of states

Category 1	State	Political Evolution	Actual Status
Democratic institutions never rooted	Angola	Independence war and civil war	Still in conflict
	Comores	Succession of coups d'etat	Chronic instability
	Djibouti	Dictature - Civil war	Instability
	Ethiopia	Monarchy -Civil War	Guerilla victory
	Guinea	Dictature-Military coup	Militaro-Civilian government
	Guinea-Bissau	Independ. war- Coup d'etat	Ibid.
	Equatorial Guinea	Dictature-Military coup	Ibid.
	Lesotho	Monarchy-Military coups	Monarchy
	Liberia	Oligarchy-Coups-Civil war	In Settlement (peace-keeping force)
	Mozambique	Independ. War- Civil war	Ibid.
Colonial inheritance	Malawi	Dictature-Elections	In transition
	Swaziland	Monarchy	Monarchy
Colonial inheritance	Sao-Tome	Dictature-Elections	In Transition

In the second category (table 3), one can find most of the African states that became independent with an embryo of democratic political institutions inherited from the last years of colonization. The struggle for independence, initiated by a handful of native intellectuals between the two World Wars, allowed to educate many people in political matters and to develop political parties competing in a democratic environment. Also, England and France, willing to retain future economical and political influence, through the "Commonwealth" and the "Communaute

Française”⁵⁸ provided some assistance in establishing democratic institutions shortly before the handover. However, for many internal and external reasons, those institutions found themselves progressively weakened or destroyed down to the collapse of the state. First, the standards were different from one country to another; the populations’ education and the native leaders’ stature were determinant in the level of democracy. Countries like Burkina-Faso and Nigeria experienced, for a short time, a real democracy before quarrels among their most influential political leaders paralyzed their economy and gave justification to military coups. Secondly, in countries like Ghana and Zambia a very charismatic leader progressively concentrated power in his hands, thus turning the state to a paternalistic one. George Ayitteh traced Nkrumah’s fall into paternalism through inadequate economic choices and lack of management skills. As he wrote:

There was a vast difference between the skills needed to fight the forces of colonialism and those needed to develop an economy successfully. . . .It is true that Nkrumah initially lacked capable administrators.⁵⁹

While in countries like Zaire and Congo, many political faction’s leaders, unable to reach a national audience, promoted ethnic or regional sentiment to foster their personal position. Such behaviors opened the way for many military dictatorships that, up to nowadays, proved unable to stop that cycle: regional or ethnic oppression-unrest-repression. Additionally, as in Mobutu’s Zaire,⁶⁰ the Cold War rivalry led some external powers to backup military coups in order to prevent governments, democratically elected at independence, to join the opposite bloc.⁶¹

⁵⁸Amano Boateng, *A Political Geography of Africa* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 112.

⁵⁹George B.N. Ayitteh, “The March Toward Tyranny,” *Africa Betrayed* (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1991), 162.

⁶⁰Michel Wayne Williams, *America in the First Congo Crisis 1960-1963* (Ann Arbor: UMI Dissertation Services, 1991), 24.

Table 3: Second Category of states

Category 2	State	Political Evolution	Actual Status
Political Institutions destroyed or weakened	Burkina-Faso	succession of coups	militaro-civilian gov.
	Ghana	Ibid.	Ibid.
	Gambia	Ibid.	Ibid.
	Nigeria	Ibid.	military government
	Togo	Ibid.	militaro-civilian gov.
	Burundi	coups d'etat - civil war	Ibid.
	Mali	military coups-elections	In Transition
	Mauretania	Succession of Coups	Militaro-civilian gov.
	Central-Africa	Ibid. Army mutiny	civil.gov.
	Congo	Ibid. Civil War	guerilla victory
	Uganda	Ibid. Ibid.	Ibid.
	Rwanda	Ibid. Ibid.	Ibid.
	Sierra-Leone	Ibid. Ibid.	still in war
	Somalia	Ibid. Ibid.	state collapse
	Sudan	Ibid. Ibid.	still in war
	Chad	Ibid. Ibid.	militaro-civilian gov.
	DRC (Zaire)	Ibid. Ibid	guerilla victory
	Zambia	Civil.Dictature - Elect.	In Transition

To sum up, the states listed in that second category went into that process for two main reasons. The process of nation-building trying to bind together different ethnic groups went wrong because the leaders had not the required management skills or had strong personal ambition. Also, those factors were facilitated by the Cold War environment: many dictatorships were able to stand

⁶¹Donald L. Gordon and April A. Gordon, "The role of Foreign Powers in Africa International Relations," *Understanding Contemporary Africa* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers), 145-154.

just because they were backed by one of the blocs. Today, except in Mali and Zambia where governments were democratically elected in the early Nineties, the states listed in the second category are still under a military regime, were overthrown by a guerrilla or went under a militaro-civilian rule; a former military government where an officer resigned from the army just to be elected as president. In fact, such governments are still organized and run like military ones.

The third category (table 4) encompasses the states where frames of democratic institutions always existed but are holding on a precarious balance due to flaws in their management. They are economically and politically stable, allow a certain level of freedom of expression but have not yet fostered a true democratic culture. In Senegal and Tanzania, the organization of the precolonial society, the level of education before independence and the first leaders' influence were determinant in that stability. Leonardo Villalon aptly argues that Senegalese religiously based groups have been major component of a political system, that has been among the most stable in Africa, rather than destabilizing forces like elsewhere in the world.⁶² While in the other states, like Cote D'Ivoire or Kenya, their natural resources or strategic location draw a large military and economic assistance from external powers, willing to preserve their interests.

Though most of these countries enjoy some political stability, they are under the rule of a strong political party dominating a multiple-parties system. They owe their stability to a strong support from external powers and to a consensus among the most influential sub-state actors, rather than to effective checks and balances between the executive, the legislative and the judicial branch.

⁶²Leonardo A. Villalon, *Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 15-16.

Table 4: Third Category of states

Category 3	State	Political Evolution	Actual Status
Institutions hold since independence on a Certain balance	Botswana Cameroon Cote D'Ivoire Gabon Kenya Senegal Seychelles Tanzania	Transfer of power Regular elections but not any true political alternance	Multipartism Elected Government, but a dominant party

The fourth category (table 5) includes states where democratic and fair elections were held two times in this decade. Though countries like Benin and Madagascar switched forth and back in one or more of the three first categories, they are experiencing a recognized stability after their military governments were replaced in the elections of 1990 by civilian ones, that in turn were defeated through the polls in 1996. While in Mauritius and the Cabo-Verde Islands, the former dominant parties, having ruled for more than a decade after independence, were replaced by the means of fair elections in 1991.⁶³

In sum, all of them have already experienced the “two times turnover rule” and are recognized to be on the right track of democracy.

To investigate in depth what process took place in each one of those four categories, four sample-states will be studied. Those states were selected because each one of them summarizes the characteristics of its category.

⁶³Marina Ottaway, “Rethinking Democratization,” *Collapsed States*. Edited by William Zartman (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), 246.

Table 5: Fourth Category of states

Category 4	State	Political Evolution	Actual Status
a recognized democratic political alternance occurred after elections	Benin Cabo-Verde Is Madagascar Mauritius	Succession of coups- Two Elections Monopartism-Elections Succession of coups-Two Elections Monopartism-Elections	Transfer of power with political alternance

Studying Sample States

The following four states were selected for their relevance in their category: (1) Liberia was blessed with sufficient natural resources for its small population but was characterized by a low level of education. Also the country had enough time to develop a democratic society but was ruled by an ethnic minority and had not of any kind of colonial legacy; (2) Congo Democratic Republic (former Zaire) was a summary of all the factors that weakened or destroyed political institutions in second category's states since it had a very poor colonial legacy, was a disputed piece during the Cold War era and produced a salient example of personalization of power; (3) Senegal is the archetype of the third category: a state where regular elections are held since the nineteenth century, with a very rich colonial legacy and a post independence assistance provided by the international community but where the democratic culture is hindered by some weaknesses; and (4) Benin is the typical example of African states that succeeded in establishing conditions for sustainable democracy and political stability.

Liberia

When Liberia was founded in 1847 by emancipated slaves from the United States of America, there were few republics of its kind all over the world. Despite its natural resources and appreciable foreign supports, that country failed to foster democracy and the state collapsed in 1990.

For almost 150 years, Liberia was under a typical colonial rule, the political power and the wealth being monopolized by the Americo-Liberian oligarchy. As quoted from Arnold Rivkin:

The indigenous people remained for the most part outside the structure, except as in all classic colonial contexts, as the source of labor when needed, and as the source of external threats which served, when needed, to induce cohesion within the colonial group.⁶⁴

That “primacy of the settlers society over the indigenous African communities”⁶⁵ laid the foundations for an oligarchic state where the African-American remained at the top of the pyramid, some educated natives emerged as a narrow middle class and the largest share of the population stayed out of the political structures like in any segregationist state. That social and political stratification came from Liberia’s historical legacy. Unlike the leaders of the American settlers, the Liberians were freshly freed slaves without any level of education or political background. As a consequence, they gathered in small self-sustaining communities along the coast and did not develop an open colonial exploitation like the French or British; the trade with natives and the use of their workforce were very limited during the first century of cohabitation. Also, they copied as much as possible the United States’ political institutions but for the sole use and benefit of the

⁶⁴Arnold Rivkin, *Nation-Building in Africa* (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1969), 202.

⁶⁵Amos Sawyer, *The Emergence of Autocracy in Liberia* (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1992), 6.

settlers. The political changes that started Africa between the Two Wars affected marginally Liberia. Though the country experienced some economic and social mutations with the expansion of cash-cropping, especially hevea, coffee, and cocoa, during World War II and the development of schools or trade unions, the progress benefited exclusively to the African-American community and to very few natives who rose to form the small middle class. President Tubman, who ruled for twenty-seven years, was blinded by a lack of vision that hindered his ability to acknowledge that the colonial and paternalistic rule was over. Nor the independence of the other African countries in the early Sixties, neither many post-independence changes in the continent did not induce significant changes in that rule. In the late Seventies, President Tolbert was ruling in a country where wealth and politics were monopolized by his small “caste.” As an illustration, all the cabinet members and the army officers were Congos, descending from the former American slaves. Then, army non-commissioned officers from the dominated ethnic groups took the first opportunity to overthrow the government in April 1980 but Samuel Doe’s rule was plagued by the lack of education. Martin Lowenkopf, correctly, characterized Doe’s seizure of power as:

a symbol of unpredictable events...an unlettered, noncommissioned officer who was in the right(or wrong) place at the right(or wrong) time, and who, with a handful of equally unlettered comrades overthrew a regime that was basically unlucky, unprepared for such an inside job, and was exceedingly feckless in the bargain.⁶⁶

Consequently, a couple of years later, the government split in factions based on ethnic alliances: Doe and his fellow Krahn started an ethnic cleansing of the army directed mainly toward the Manos and the Gios led by his former deputy Sergeant Thomas Quickwompa. In 1989,

⁶⁶Martin Lowenkopf, “Liberia: Putting the State Back Together,” *Collapsed States*. Edited by William Zartman (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), 101.

Charles Taylor backed by his Congo community launched a guerrilla war that completed the collapse of the Liberian state.

To summarize, that Liberia's implosion was originated by the antagonism between sub-state actors generated by the oligarchic nature of the state. The country was progressively split along ethnic lines due to policies of exclusion.

Congo Democratic Republic

Former Zaire became independent in 1960 with an embryo of multipartism and one of the world's largest reserves of minerals. However, the country ended in a tremendous political and economic chaos. Some researchers traced the roots of that failure in a poor colonial legacy while others linked it with the personalization of power or tied it with the cold war rivalry.

As already demonstrated by many researchers, the actual Democratic Republic of Congo became independent with one of the worst colonial legacies. Initially, a personal possession of King Leopold II of Belgium, the country became a Belgian colony ruled for an intensive extraction of raw materials.⁶⁷ The administration was mainly in the hand of agents appointed by farmers and mining corporations. Thus, at the independence in 1960, there was not any infrastructure and the few Congolese having attended the schools opened by christian missionaries were educated at the lowest level, just to fill positions of clerks or somehow. For those same reasons, the political movement for independence that grew in the British and French colonies was very limited in Belgian Congo. As a consequence, although Patrice Lumumba was rising as a preeminent political figure, there was not any nationwide recognized and accepted leader. Then, in the days following independence, a struggle for power started among many political factions and the civil war

⁶⁷Donald L. and April A. Gordon, *Understanding Contemporary Africa* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), 63.

resumed when the province of Katanga asked for secession. After five years of turmoil, an almost unlettered Mobutu rose from the ranks to establish a military rule. That consequence of the civil war was a proof of the weakness of political institutions built in a hurry and headed by leaders without any political experience or managerial skills, as summarized by Crawford Young:

The fragile decolonization innovations of a constitutionalized state-civil society relationship, mediated by open political competition, served as a legitimating myth for the transfer of power itself, but soon ran afoul of the autocratic and hegemonic impulses which were the more enduring legacy of the colonial state.⁶⁸

Thus, the personalization of power will reach unthinkable heights during Mobutu's rule. Jackson and Rosberg described such a process where a military leader, like Mobutu, seizes power as an accepted liberator before turning to an autocrat as "Caesarism." As they explain:

Caesarism refers to rule seized in a "post-constitutional" state with widespread public disorder....Under Caesarism the consolidation and expansion of power in the hands of the ruler and at the expense of other powerseekers is its own justification because the misrule of a strongman, no matter how despotic, is preferable to the non-rule and disorder of a stateless situation.⁶⁹

Also, being able to impress the Western community as the the standing wall against Communism in Central and Austral Africa, Mobutu benefited from the Cold War environment. He took the opportunity of that support to develop an oppressive and patriarchal state, consolidating his power. However, the lack of managerial skills combined with an oligarchic rule based on ethnicity and corruption loosened the state's authority in many remote areas of that large country.

⁶⁸Crawford Young, "The African Colonial State and its Political Legacy," *The Precarious Balance*. Edited by Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan (Boulder: Westview Press Inc., 1988), 56.

⁶⁹Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosbert, *Personal Rule in Black Africa* (Berkeley: UCLA Press, 1982), 167-168.

The state-society interactions went progressively through a spectrum of relations ranging from coercion, nepotism, corruption initiated by the president himself. Then, the population responded by passive resistance , emigration and later active resistance.

To summarize, Mobutu's governing methods generated challenging sub-state actors both within and outside the state. There were many resentments from influential citizens because all the business opportunities were monopolized by the president's kin and friends.⁷⁰ Additionally, huge dissensions destroyed progressively the armed forces, as illustrated by this quote from General Mahele, Joint Chief of Staff, during the successful attacks of the guerrilla in March 1977: "this routed army is not mine, this runaway army belongs to a clan."⁷¹

As a consequence, Laurent Desire Kabilé launched his offensive in a country ripe for a violent change, where the state have already collapsed under the pressure of many sub-state actors ranging from the inefficient interests groups generated by nepotism and corruption, the antagonist army leaders to the oppressed ethnic groups like the Banyamulenge and the Katangese.

Senegal

Senegal acceded to independence in 1960 with one of the best colonial legacies. The state inherited from France an adequate educational system, a skilled administration and a well-established pluralistic democratic system. However, that country is known to owe its recognized, political and economic, stability to a strong consensus among state and sub-state actors, particularly the religious leaders. This shift from a multipartism system to a consensual one was largely depicted by Paul Marty, Christian Coulon, Lucy Behrman, Donal Cruise O'Brien, and

⁷⁰Ibid., 174.

⁷¹Francois Soudan, "Histoire secrète de la chute de Mobutu," *Revue Jeune Afrique* (Paris) 13-26 August 1997, 24.

recently Leonardo Villalon. That phenomenon was originated by the process of nation-building in a poor country that acceded to independence with a narrow urban class living under Westernized standards and a large rural majority already accustomed to authority. It is imperative to refer to history to understand why Senegal is enjoying such a recognized level of democracy with a very traditionalist political system. Unlike in many African regions, Senegal was structured in many kingdoms centuries before colonization. Those monarchies had a common characteristic: the kingship was inherited but an assembly of elders and chiefs had the right to dismiss the king and replace him with a family member in case of mismanagement or bad behavior. That senatorial feature strengthened the governance at local level and built a system of indirect rule with a whole class of administrators between the monarchs and their subjects. After introduction of Islam, the lettered marabouts took progressively those administrative positions filling the functions of teachers, judges, and assistant to the king. That evolution led them to highest commanding positions like chiefs and sometimes kings or emperors, Maba Diakhou Ba and El Hadj Omar Tall being examples. As a consequence, the French colonizers ruled the country through its religious and traditional leaders with a mix of coercion and rewards,⁷² thus demonstrating a deep understanding of the social mapping. Additionally, Senegal became early involved in democratic political life; the first local elections were held in the nineteenth century⁷³ and by 1914, the natives of four towns were granted French citizenship with full rights to vote. After World War, the society was clearly divided in three social classes: a well-educated elite having held cabinet positions in the French government, an urban middle class educated in democratic values and a large peasantry. However, those classes were not as distinct as in the European context since the

⁷²Lucy Behrman, *Muslim Brotherhoods in Senegal* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 4.

same families had members in each one of those groups. Thus, political affiliation was based on kinship, friendship, and neighborhood rather than on ideology. After independence, that factionalism became the mode of governance within the ruling party: the faction, or clan in the Senegalese terminology is the basic support for a leader competing for political office with the first unifying principle being the prospect of material reward,⁷⁴ to be redistributed. The political stability of Senegal owes to those salient characteristics of the society: a large faithful peasantry, whether Muslim or Christian, who inherited the sense of submission to authority with traditional and religious leaders as intermediaries and a middle class having various connections to the ruling elite. As aptly demonstrated by Jackson and Rosberg, “the regime has been supported by those two elements, both of which exhibiting basically a patron-client structure and a culture of personal or traditional obligation and deference.”⁷⁵ That complex historical legacy explains, also, why marxist and ethnically based parties failed in Senegal and why an ultra-liberalist party will hardly emerge: the faithful populations linked Communism to Atheism, the long cohabitation under colonial rule developed friendship among ethnic groups and the Senegalese peasant still expects a helping hand from his political leader.⁷⁶ Thus, the first president Leopold Sedar Senghor displayed recognized administrative skills because he understood and used fully that social mapping. However this “Senegalese Democracy” is progressively showing its negative side in producing challenging sub-state actors.

⁷³Johnson Wesley G. Jr., *The Emergence of Black Power in Senegal: The Struggle for Power in The Four Communes* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971), 27.

⁷⁴Donald B. Cruise O'Brien, *Saints and Politicians: Essays in the Organization of a Senegalese Peasant Society* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 149.

⁷⁵Robert Jackson and Carl G. Rosbert, “Autocrats and Lordship,” Personal Rule in Black Africa (Berkeley: UCLA Press, 1982), 92.

Since the late seventies, the complexity of those relations is combining with new domestic and international factors to loosen the state's authority, by an atomization of the centers of decision.⁷⁷ The religious leaders are seeking more and more power, the factions or "political clans" within the dominant party are contesting the long-time established rules, the opposing parties are more skilled to rule while the peasantry and the urban youth are asking for a better life.

First, after independence, some religious groups became more and more involved in politics while others opted for passivity, isolationism or contestation. The explanation of these four different attitudes is found in the nature or the strength of the six Muslims currents and the Christian church existing in Senegal. The Tijans leaders, representing the largest group, became very influential in politics because the political parties were actively seeking their electoral weight. While the Murids, the most active in the country's economy, got strongly involved in lobbying for their interests. The Layenes, a small group in the outskirts of the capital city, and the Qadriya who have small centers spread all over Senegal remained more or less passive. A small Tijan orthodox community chose to isolate itself in the religious village of Medina-Gunass while insignificant groups of students, scholarized in the Arab countries, opted for an open but non-violent contestation. All those attitudes are in the appropriate nature of the relationship between rulers and people defined by the Muslim philosophy; those options based on the life of Prophet Muhamad are cooperation (accepting the religious leader as political leader *Amir El Moumini*), submission (*Diebelu*), fleeing (*Hijra*) or fighting (*Jihad*). The Christian community always played a discreet but very effective role through its network of schools and confraternities. Today, the religious leaders are asking for more power since they have accumulated enough wealth to extend their

⁷⁶Donald Cruise O'Brien, *Saints and Politicians: Essays in the Organization of a Senegalese Peasant Society* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 187.

influence beyond religion, are better educated and have realized how far the competing political parties are indebted to them.

Second, dissenssions are arising within the ruling party. In the past years, factional fights used to occur at the base of the pyramid because, as demonstrated by Jonathan Baker, “potential factions at lower levels used to ally themselves with the challenger to dislodge the incumbent at the higher level.”⁷⁸ Today, the succession of the ruling leaders is quite open and there is a bitter struggle within the younger generation of politicians.⁷⁹ That new feature is well-illustrated by the decision of a “political clan” led by former minister Djibo Leyti Ka to compete, as an independent candidate, for the legislative’s elections scheduled in May 1998.

Third, they are new elements in the galaxy of sub-state actors in Senegal: the emergence of non-governmental organizations like the Human Right Associations and the Consumers’ Unions. An association like the “Telephone, Water and Electricity Consumers” (ADETEL) is already campaigning for the next elections.

An additional factor generating challenging sub-state actors is the developped of underground business or “informal economic sector.” Like in many developping countries, large shares of the country’s economy were developed by unlettered self-made men who run unregistered corporations. Though employing hundred thousand of workers and handling large budgets, those individuals do not pay taxes and other charges. As a result, there is a large flow of cash generally

⁷⁷Gadio Cheikh Tidiane, “La Crise de la Transition au Senegal,” *Sud Quotidien* (Dakar) 3 March 1998, 16.

⁷⁸Jonathan S. Barker, “Political Factionalism in Senegal,” *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 7.2 (1973): 287-303.

⁷⁹Paye Moussa. “La succession est ouverte.” *Revue Jeune Afrique Economie* (Paris) 2-15 March 1998, 94-96.

used to import goods sold at a lower price or to smuggle outside of the country large quantities of minerals and crops; that form of dumping had already destroyed a lot of jobs in the emerging industries. Also, those businessmen tend to gather in cartels or trusts to monopolize some economic sectors, like the importation of rice, in order to impose higher prices on the market. Consequently, besides loosening the state's authority in large economic sectors and then geographical areas, those actors can produce a huge social explosion if they raise without any notice the price of a vital merchandise.

Finally, the increasing level of education and the flow of information due to the world's globalization are also generating factors. The opposing political parties are accurately deciphering the social mapping of Senegal. Actually, all of them have abandoned their ultra leftist ideology and some of them have accepted position in the present government in order to have better access both to the public and to the religious leaders. In the meantime, the old consensus is challenged by the educated but unemployed urban youth who are asking for a better life. Also, the parents of those jobless youngsters, the large peasantry having marginally benefited from the economic and social progress, is likely to lose faith on its traditional religious and political leaders. Since all those actors tend to join formal or informal groupings to advance their cause, the question is to know how far are they to use violent means?

Benin

Like many French colonies, Benin became independent in 1960 with an elected government but went under a strong marxist-leninst military dictatorship, after a succession of coups d'etat. However, in 1991, General Mathieu Kerekou was defeated in democratic elections and the country experienced a recognized political alternance in 1996 when President Nicephore Soglo was beaten by his predecessor.

The salient feature in Benin's transitions is the role played by sub-state actors, backed by the international community.

First, Benin had a large diaspora spread all over the world. That large emigration was the result of coercive policies initiated by the militaro-marxist government of General Mathieu Kerekou who seized power in 1972. Fleeing the restrictions of a pro communist regime, many people established themselves in the neighboring countries while the intellectuals, mostly educated in French universities, found positions elsewhere. As an illustration, former president Nicephore Soglo and most of the members of his cabinet were holding some key positions in international non-governmental organizations like the World Bank or the United Nations.

Second, the political life had been very active in Benin from the years preceding independence to the military coup of 1972. The country was the only one in Africa to initiate a turning presidency: three candidates were elected to rule each as a president for two years. As a legacy of that history, the military regime had never been able to suppress totally the political debate. Consequently, in 1989, violent civil rights' demonstrations forced the military government to organize a "National Conference" involving all the influential individuals and citizens' associations.⁸⁰ That meeting established the basis for the future political life in designing a new constitution, with elections to be held in 1991. Such a mutation was possible because the worldwide wave of democratization, generated by the collapse of communism, and a deepening economic crisis combined to weaken the militaro-marxist government's authority.

Additionaly, the country being one of the poorest in Africa, with a GNP of \$2 billions, relied a lot on foreign aid provided by Western countries and intergovernmental organizations. So,

⁸⁰Sennen Andriamirado, "Le Benin hors des eaux troubles?" *Revue Jeune Afrique* (Paris) 28 December 1989, 24-25.

firm economic and political pressures from those external powers combined to create an environment favourable to the development of the political influence of all those internal and international sub-state actors.

To summarize, Benin is a typical illustration of the African countries where the globalization of the world's economy, the growing influence of the intergovernmental organizations and the new political environment due to the collapse of Communism combined to favorize the emergence of sub-state actors or the re-emergence of formerly influential ones. That trend was accurately predicted by Neil J. Smelser in 1986 and verified, in 1989-1990, by the events in East Europe and Africa:

One of the hallmarks of human history in the late twentieth century is the increasing internationalization of the world: in production, trade, finance, technology threats to security, communications, research, education, and culture. One major consequence of this is that the mutual penetration of economic, political and social forces among the nations of the world is increasingly salient; and it may be the case that the government of nation-states are progressively losing degrees of direct control over the global forces that affect them.⁸¹

⁸¹Neil J. Smelser, "External and Internal Factors in Theories of Social Change," *Paper presented at the German-American Conference on Social Change and Modernization*. (Berkeley: California, August 1986), 1.

CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS

The literature review in chapter 2 and the institutional/social mapping in chapter 3 pointed out how sub-state actors are generated or empowered in the African countries, the result being a progressive weakening of the state. As summarized in chapter 2, the inability of governments to adapt to a new domestic or international environment, a disconnection between the ruling elite and the society, a poor colonial legacy and corruption are the four factors combining to loosen the state's authority. Additionally, the comparison conducted in chapter 3 suggested how different leaderships influenced those four factors and the other historic, economic or cultural elements to produce the four main political mutations used to categorize the African states. So, both the literature review and the comparative study suggest that leadership played a significant role in the generation or the empowerment of sub-state actors. Thus, the following analysis intend to investigate what are the interactions between sub-state actors, society and leadership in the collapse, the stabilization or the renewal of states. Three basic questions must be answered about the exercise of power in Africa. "Are the governments or the sub-state actors in charge? Who could have influenced the situation? How that influence was exercised?" Those issues were aptly stated in the following quote from John T. Fishel:

The terms leadership and management-concepts respectively dear to the military and civilian communities-both attempt to deal with the question, "Who is in charge?" The military notion of "command *and* control," perhaps, best summarizes the complexity of the issue. We are not dealing here merely with the issue of authority but also of how that authority is used, not used, or misused. In turn, we must also address who can influence the situation and how that influence is exercised.⁸²

⁸²John T. Fishel, "The Management structures for Just Cause, Desert Storm and UNOSOM II," *Managing Contemporary Conflict: The Pillars of Success*. Edited by Max G. Manwaring and William J. Olson (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 191.

Then, to establish with accuracy what role leadership and management played in those four mutations, each one them will be analyzed throughout three key principles of leadership: vision, ethics and professional skills. The process is restricted to those three principles because they are recurrent in the available authoritative literature dealing with leadership.⁸³

Outcomes of the Analysis

In the first category of states, a lack of ethics and a short vision of the leaders originated the process. Except in the former Portuguese colonies that experienced a civil war just after independence, all of them started with leaders having a firm authority on a population largely uneducated. Instead of using that influence to educate the population and establish a democratic society, they attempted to strengthen their personal power using various alliances. They kept on ruling as monarchs like Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, turned the state into an oligarchy like Kamuzu Banda of Malawi or into a segregationist one as in Liberia.

In those kind of states where the power is concentrated in the hands of a tribal, regionalist or ethnic group, the ruling caste was always forced to rely on the less educated members of its community or of an other minority in order to hold low and mid-level administrative positions or to fill the armed forces ranks. Unfortunately, from promotions to appointments, those unlettered individuals rose to key positions, particularly in the army. Then, the state went into the hands of an unskilled ethnic, regionalistic or tribal group because families ties always prevailed on competence in any promotion or appointment. Also, having used those kins or friends as a folding screen for

⁸³ Ralph M. Stogdill, *Leadership Abstracts and Bibliography, 1904 to 1974* (Columbus: Ohio State University, 1977). Isaac Shapera and William Shack, *Politics in Leadership*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979. Joe Oppenheimer and Norman Frohlich, *Political Leadership and Collective Goods*. New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1971 US ARMY. *Leadership and Command at Senior Level . FM 22-103*. FT Leavenworth: Center for Army Leadership, June 1987.

illegal practices like corruption and repression, the rulers became progressively indebted to them. Then, those unexperienced and unpredictable subjects became challenging sub-state actors since the governants found their hands tied in case of mismanagement or bad behavior. Such political system generated sub-state actors, asking for more and more shares of power or the power itself, for two main reasons: they are centered around coteries of incompetent people competing for favors or power and are excluding competent citizens. The governants was never able to realize that appointing incompetent individuals at state-level positions, keeping dynamic fractions of the population at the army's lower level ranks or forcing them, by exclusion, to join opposing political and armed movements were not policies protecting their interests in the long term. As explained by James Rosenau, those "shifting patterns of legitimacy, loyalty and authority weaken whole systems and strengthen sub-groups."⁸⁴ In the long run, the state system became so ineffective that any attempt to overthrow the government succeeded or put the country in a chronic instability. Also, those weaknesses inherent to that kind of state explain why many coups d'etat were successfully carried by a handful of junior or noncommissioned officers and why most of the governments were quickly defeated by small guerrilla movements or wiped out at the first democratic election .

To summarize, the leaders personal interests were above the nation's vital interests. Due to that lack of ethics, they did not implement any long-term project for the advancement of the society. Consequently, there was not any vision sustaining and driving the maturation of the society. Since any society is a living body subject to continual changes, the unexpected ones became preeminent on the desired ones.

⁸⁴James N. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), 29.

In the second category of states, the lack of ethics and managerial skills combined to weaken or destroy the emerging political institutions. Those shortages in leadership generated internal quarrels, a progressive personalization of power and a deterioration of the socio-economic conditions.

As illustrated by the study in Zaire, personal ambitions backed by religion or ethnicity laid the conditions for an internal crisis in many countries. Then, in trying to bring some stability, the leaders abrogated progressively many fundamental rights but limited managerial skills or own ambitions prevented them to stay within acceptable limits. As a consequence, the social and economic conditions worsened for the populations and those countries went into the cycle of unrest-repression-oppression. Additionally, many armies used those troubles as justification for their irruption in politics but, for the same reasons, proved as inefficient as their civilian predecessors.

To sum up, personal ambitions and lack of skills to rule efficiently a country established the conditions for the African autocratic states, being military or civilian ones. Due to the oppressive nature of the state, the population were never fully associated and consequently chose to emigrate, oppose or live out of the formal economy. All those societal responses generated challenging sub-state actors since they were channeled through influential individuals or small groups, rather than democratic citizens' organizations like political parties or trade unions. Those state society relations labeled incorporation, disengagement and active opposition⁸⁵ by Victor Azarya (figure 2) are common to all collapsing African states where an embryo of political institutions, inherited from the last years of colonization, were weakened or destroyed.

⁸⁵Victor Azarya, "Reordering Society Relations," *The Precarious Balance*. Edited by Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1988), 14.

At the opposite, the actual governments are strongly challenged by either the heirs of those traditional leaders or other emerging actors. It is the result of a poor leadership due mainly to a lack of ethics and a disconnection from the society.

First, the next generation of leaders sought the support of traditional leaders with material rewards because they were competing for personal interests or did not have the kind of legitimacy of the first generation. Then, those politicians became indebted to traditional and religious who are going out of control because they got both wealth and electoral weight in the process. Also, it established corruption as a mode of governance destroying both the economy and the confidence of many citizens in their political leaders. Then, the situation being worsened by the external economic factors affecting the developing countries, those citizens are progressively building their life out of the formal institutions. That process of disengagement from the state explains the development of the underground economy and of the various challenging national non-governmental organizations.

Second, most of the new leaders do not have the cultural and intellectual basis to understand both the society and the actual environment. Some of them missed the opportunity to be educated in African values because they attended Western schools in a period where the colonial policy of assimilation was at its heights. While the others lived totally cut from the society because they joined the ruling elite at a very young age, and with a limited experience of public affairs in the period following the independence of their country. That phenomenon explains the inability to apprehend the changes occurring within the society and to implement a leadership adapted to those mutations. Such mutations, where traditional and religious leaders are getting strong enough to challenge the state or where groups of independent citizens are emerging to influence the state's policy, is common to all the states, where the stability was based on a consensus rather than on




Figure 2. Societal responses by Degree of Activism and Intensity of Attitude

pluralistic democracy. It is the consequence of an indirect rule where competing politicians sought the peasantry's support or governed it through traditional and religious leaders, still living in a feudal environment. As aptly stated by Samuel Huntington "The price of that rural support is the abandonment of the regime of many of its modern values and practices."⁸⁶

⁸⁶Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (Massachusetts: Colonial Press Inc., 1968), 77.

Such political systems prevail in all the African countries where kingdoms existed before colonization, like in Senegal, Nigeria, Cameroon, etc. They inherited an organized and hierarchical society with well-established ruling mechanisms but are still unable to adapt it to a new environment because there is a certain fear to undertake any enterprise against an old culture. That is why they are in the process of “dissipation of authority,” described by Rosenau:

It is sufficient to recognize that no collectivity could persist for long without having authority as a legal basis for the conduct of its leaders and the maintenance of its hierarchical structures. It is through the exercise of authority that decisions are made and implemented and the coherence of collectivities thereby preserved. If a collectivity lacked authority relations, if its members felt entitled to do as they pleased, goals could not be framed and energies could not be concerted; there could be no collective action, and the collectivity would soon lose its identity as a social system distinct from its environment.⁸⁷

The fourth category of African states, having experienced a recognized democratic alternance in this decade, went through the mutations described in the first three categories but were forced to adapt to the new world environment. Those states have the common characteristic of being tiny with a small population, remote, lacking resources, depending mainly on foreign assistance and having a large active emigrated community. As a consequence, their survival was at stake with the end of the Cold War: economically and strategically, they were not the more attractive ones and had to comply with the new policies linking any aid to progress in democratization. Those conditionalities, focusing on civil society rather than on governments, helped many sub-state actors to emerge and empowered others who were politically suppressed As quoted from Andrew Clayton:

This focus on civil-society has emerged from the new policy agenda on good governance that was increasingly promoted by official donors in the late 1980s. Initially this new agenda was primarily concerned with imposing political conditionality in order to put pressure on authoritarian and corrupt regimes to

⁸⁷James N. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1969), 186.

reform; aid was to be made conditional on governments in the South respecting human rights, instituting multi-party elections and reforming state bureaucracy.⁸⁸

James Rosenau theorized that process as an “evolution from a state-centric world to a multi-centric world”⁸⁹, where many external and internal forces are interacting to influence today’s states (figure 3).

Recurrent Patterns

As highlighted in the outcomes, those four processes generating challenging sub-state actors indicate three common overlapping patterns. Poor or inadapted leadership lead to an excessive concentration of powers in the hands of an individual or a small group, a deterioration of the socioeconomic network and a foreign military or diplomatic intervention .

First, those mutations where the political and economic power end in the hands of an individual or a small group widen the gap between the ruling elite and the society. In those modes of governance where the “winners take all,” the societal responses ranged from disengagement to active armed opposition, as demonstrated by Victor Azarya⁹⁰ and William Zartman.⁹¹

⁸⁸Andrew Clayton, ed. “NGOs, Civil Society and the State. Building Democracy in Transitional Society,” *INTRAC NGO Management and Policy Series No.5* (Oxford, London, 1996), 7.

⁸⁹James N. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), 14.

⁹⁰Azarya, Victor, “Reordering Society Relations,” *The Precarious Balance*. Edited by Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1988), 13-14.

⁹¹Zartman, William, ed., *Collapsed States* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), 1-10.




Figure3. Evolution from a state-centric world to a multi-centric world

Second, a disastrous economic situation laid the conditions for internal military interventions in giving army and guerilla leaders a, right or wrong, justification. The waste of resources, corruption and nepotism developed a perceived relative deprivation among the military or some fractions of the population. Such crisis in developing underground economy and other societal responses loosened the state's authority in many segments of the population and geographic areas, ripening the situation to violent overthrows.

The third recurrent pattern is a foreign, military or diplomatic, intervention. Wherever, the situation was not ripe enough for sub-state actors to emerge and take over, the country went in an

instable or chaotic situation. Then, influential individuals were backed by one or more foreign countries to bring a certain stability. Among those cases, one can list the numerous French military interventions, the US involvement in Mobutu's Zaire,⁹² the Tanzanian offensive against Idi Amin in Uganda in 1979 and the Senegalese intervention in Gambia in 1981. Also, some diplomatic options were carried, like the peace-keeping operations in Liberia and most of the elections held in the Nineties when the international community linked any economic aid with progress in democratization. Then, such changes were results of domestic and international pressures, rather than the normal outcomes of elections scheduled in a democratic constitution. However it is important to note that in many cases, elections were organized just to legitimize a rule in converting a military government to a civilian one.

Anomalies in Outcomes

However, two small groups of African states experienced a transfer of power that can be categorized out of those three patterns. In Botswana, Cameroon, Cote D'Ivoire, Kenya, and Senegal, the actual presidents were appointed by their predecessors who left for personal or medical reasons. While in the Republic of South African, Zimbabwe and Namibia, state power was just opened to the large majority after decades of apartheid.

Any one of those states did not really pass the test of democratic alternance. In the first group of five countries, elections were held to reelect the nominated president fostering monopartism and concentration of power. While in second group, the mode of replacement of the first generation's leaders, Mandela, Mugabe and Nujoma will tell what is the real nature of those states.

⁹²Michael Wayne Williams, *America in the first Congo Crisis 1960-1963* (Ann Arbor: UMI Dissertation Services, 1991), 45.

Insufficiencies in Outcomes

This thesis intended to investigate the three-tiered role of sub-state actors in the destabilization, the stabilization and the renewal of collapsed states. The first tier is illustrated by the first and second categories of states, the second by the third category ones and the third one by the fourth category ones. However, the third tier have been partially covered. The democratic mutations in Benin, Cabo-Verde, Madagascar and Mauritius were fully studied since their transition is complete. While the violent state's renewal of Congo Democratic Republic, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda where not deeply investigated for two reasons: they are still in transition being administrated by a militaro-civilian apparatus inherited from the guerrilla and their true history is not yet told due a residual insecurity.⁹³ They are exactly at the point where started most of the collapsed states, four decades ago: each one of those states has its "Caesar," Ethiopia has many political parties identified to ethnic groups, Uganda is advocating democracy under a single party, Rwanda has a mix militaro-civilian government and ethnic minority dominance,⁹⁴ and Congo Democratic Republic is accused of leaning toward the cult of personality.⁹⁵

⁹³Patrick Smith, "The contras return," *Africa Confidential* Vol. 39 no.4 (London) 20 February 1998, 5.

⁹⁴Mohamed Youssoufou Saliou, "Kagame jette le masque," *Jeune Afrique Economie*. (Paris) 2-15 March 1998, 17.

⁹⁵Bapuwa Mwamba, "Kabila comme Mobutu," *Jeune Afrique Economie* (Paris) 2-15 March 1998, 17.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

Summary

At the end of this second millennium, smaller and more complex conflicts are likely to emerge and Military Operations Other Than War will become the main focus, particularly in areas like Africa. To prevent or respond adequately to those situations, threat to internal and international security, it is imperative to understand what cultural, political and economic factors originate the collapse or the stabilization of states. Studying those mutations in Africa South of the Sahara remains a complex task for many political and cultural reasons but an emerging trend gives the opportunity approach them in a global view.

Those political and cultural reasons combine to make it very difficult to understand politics in the continent. First, foreign political influence is still very important and direct on the African state. Second, Africa is experiencing an extremely fast historical evolution illustrated by the transition of some areas from a middle-age era to the twentieth century in less than three decades. Third, the continent is culturally very porous since the foreign influences, being Arab or European, are greater in Africa than in most of the other formerly colonized regions. Also, it is very difficult to establish a direct causality between culture and politics because almost all the African states are ethnically heterogeneous.

However, the significant role played by sub-state actors is a fact common to all the African states. Since independence, traditional and religious leaders had always been influent in countries like Burkina-Faso, Cameroon, Nigeria, Senegal, or Tanzania, where hierarchical monarchic societies existed before colonization. Today, those actors are already influent or are emerging in all the other countries where different cultural groups are being united in the process of nation-state

building initiated during colonization; Kenya and Cote D'Ivoire being illustrations. Also, there are three new aspects one can observe all over the continent: (1) leaders are emerging from the economic sector, the political parties, the labor corporations or the civil-society adding to the categories of sub-state actors; (2) most of them are challenging the state; and (3) the globalization in economy, the expansion of communications and the renewal of religious sentiment are developing sub-state actors' transnational influence.

Many previous works concluded how economic problems, ineffective decolonization policies, lack of democracy and reemergence of ethnicity combined to originate conflicts in Africa but highlighted important particularities, too. On one hand, there is not yet any conflict purely ideological or economic. On the other hand, the influence of sub-state actors was determinant in state stability and conflict resolution. The latter is illustrated by all the cases in the Great Lakes region, Chad, Liberia, Ghana, or Mali where a "strongman"⁹⁶ emerged from a guerrilla, the army or a political movement to settle down a long lasting instability.

To understand why, in identical conditions, some leaders succeeded in stabilizing the state while others failed to prevent the emergence of challenging sub-state actors, this thesis investigated an hypothesis based on failure in leadership. A research plan in six steps, based on Paul D. Leedy's "helical concept"⁹⁷ was developed to study the correlation between state's collapse or stabilization, leadership and sub-state actors. The area of study was restricted to Africa South of the Sahara because that area of the continent presents more cases than any other region.

⁹⁶Njaguna Ng'ethe, "Strongmen, State Formation, Collapse, and Reconstruction" *Collapsed States*. Edited by William Zartman (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), 251.

⁹⁷Paul D. Leedy, *Practical Research*, 4th ed. (New York: Macmillan Pub. Co., 1989), 9.

Most of the literature uses the historical framework to explain the political mutations occurring in Africa South of the Sahara. As a consequence, though this large body addresses the role of leadership and sub-state actors in the positive or negative evolution of the state, the tendency had been always to link disturbances in the continent with culture, being tribalism, ethnicity or religion. However, some of the recent authoritative works are progressively acknowledging four other factors generating troubles: (1) the inability of governments to adapt to a new domestic or international environment; (2) a disconnection between the ruling elite and the society; (3) a poor colonial legacy; and (4) a growing corruption.

First, some leaders are

slow or unable to adapt to a new environment generated by the increasing level of education, the information revolution, the development of communications and the progressive interdependence of economies. Many regimes are still unable to acknowledge that a government based in a highly centralized bureaucracy can no longer work in this environment characterized by a “crisis of centrality” due to the decentralization of wealth, the dissemination of authority and the fragmentation of the notion of power.⁹⁸ Second, the social stratification originated a disconnection between the ruling elite and the society. In all the African countries, there is a large poor illiterate class still rooted in its traditions, a small middle class and a very small elite living on western standards. This huge gap in culture and education generated a political one because the functioning of modern political institutions is not yet fully understood by the majority of the population. Also, the middle class can not bridge the gap since that group is too narrow to influence decisively any situation. Third, many troubles have their roots in a geography, an economy or a political system inherited from colonialism. Some areas are subject to territorial

⁹⁸Zaki Laidi, *Sens et Puissance dans les Relations Internationales* (Paris: Editions Fayard, 1995), 35.

disputes because the boundaries were drawn without any geographic consideration, incorporating some populations into new political entities where they fall under the rule of traditionally rival groups or separating a community from its traditional agricultural lands. And those conflicts are exacerbated by new discoveries of minerals, as between Cameroon and Nigeria, or demographic explosion like in Rwanda. Also, the African economies formerly designed to fit the colonizers needs did not profit to the majority of the populations; this fact is developing a struggle of classes between a small wealthy class and a large poor one. Additionally, the political system hastily handed to leaders who were educated in a colonial despotism degenerated into dictatorships, that are violently rejected today. That poor colonial legacy had also a negative impact in the education of both the leaders and the populations. Fourth, corruption proved to be an aggravating factor in the degeneration of many states. It weakened the judiciary institutions and consequently the authority of the state. Also, corruption reinforced the influence of sub-state actors like traditional or religious leaders and eroded the confidence of many citizens who are reacting more or less violently to governments' policy.

In sum, though culture has a role in the current political mutations in Africa, the literature review demonstrated that it is just a factor among others like leadership, economy, colonial legacy or the mutations generated by end of the Cold War.

The survey of the area of study allowed to design its institutional and social map. That mapping classified the states in categories correlating the current mutations and identified what factors were determinant in the interactions between government and society.

The study of the evolution of the political institutions determined four categories of state. A first category where any kind of democratic institution has never existed; those states are either monarchies or oligarchies ruled by an ethnic minority. A second group where former governments

destroyed emerging democratic institutions because the leaders had not the skills required to manage a state or put their personal interests above everything. All the states listed in the first and the second category have already collapsed or are in a chronic instability. A third category where good leadership and cultural factors combined to build a recognized political stability but where sub-state actors are emerging to challenge the state. In the fourth category, are listed all the state having experienced two democratic replacements of government in this decade.

Culture, economy, colonial legacy, foreign influence and corruption were identified as decisive in government-society interactions. The study demonstrated that culture was a factor of stabilization in countries like Senegal while it was a factor of conflict in others like Rwanda. Colonial legacy originated a disaster for former Zaire but was a master trump for Senegal. Foreign influence fueled the war in Angola and backed Mobutu's dictatorship in Zaire but was the main factor in the stability of Kenya or Cote D'Ivoire. Also, corruption and disastrous economic conditions were among the causes of all the internal troubles and gave justifications to many military coups d'etat.

A review of that study shows that leadership is either a leading cause or an aggravating factor in all the four current mutations. In the first category of states, the monarchies and the oligarchies were destabilized because they could not acknowledge how outdated was their rule based on corruption and nepotism. So, they were rejected by populations influenced by ideals of equity and democracy widely spread by the new means of information. The second category of states failed mainly because their leaders had not the required management skills. They destroyed the economy and monopolized the left wealth, thus developing a wide perception of deprivation. In the third category, the first generation of leaders were able to take advantage of culture, colonial legacy and foreign influence and built a lasting stability. While the leaders of second generation

are losing both influence and authority because they are culturally disconnected from the society, do not have enough legitimacy or corruption is growing under their rule. In the fourth category of states, the leaders were unable to implement normal economic conditions and the survival of the state was based on foreign aid. Also, most of the educated and industrious people emigrated fleeing oppressive policies. As a consequence, those countries were more sensitive to pressures from the international community.

The analysis investigated the interaction between sub-state actors and leadership since the precedent studies established how significant was their impact in the evolution of the African state. The four current mutations generating or empowering sub-state actors were analyzed throughout three key principles of leadership, vision, ethics and professional skills.

In the first case, the actors who weakened the state from the inside or who defeated it in a guerrilla war were generated or empowered by an inadequate political system. Lacking ethics and vision, the leaders attempted to strengthen their personal power in using ethnic alliances to govern by corruption and coercion. State power became savagely contested between families and coteries because it was the only guaranteed source of wealth.⁹⁹ The state started to crumbled and finally the destruction was completed by a majority deprived of basic human rights who defeated an inefficient ruling minority. In the second case, the lack of ethics and managerial skills combined to generate internal quarrels, then dictatorship and deterioration of the economy. Such situations laid the conditions for the cycle oppression- popular unrest-repression that originated a process of destruction, as in the first category of states. In the third case, the leaders relied on traditional or religious influential individuals to consolidate their power because they did not have the legitimacy of the first generation of presidents who fought for independence. They became patrons dispensing

⁹⁹Patrick Chabal, *Power in Africa* (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc, 1994), 256.

favors to local leaders in exchange of their support. Today, they are challenged by those sub-state actors who do not want to abide by democratic rules because they would lose those privileges. That reliance of the modern state on individuals educated in a feudal culture was a lack of vision that may generate troubles in a close future. In the fourth case, external factors originated by the new world environment were decisive in the emergence of democracy. Those states relied on foreign aid mainly because the leaders did not have the skills to develop a standing economy. Also, forcing the brightest and the best educated citizens to exile was a lack of vision because it reduced the quality of manpower within the country and built a strong political opposing outside. As a result, those governments were forced to initiate reforms or resign when the international community linked any aid to democratization.

Conclusions

To conclude, the four relevant political mutations occurring today in Africa South of the Sahara are results of a long process. After independence, building new nations required to bridge gaps both between different cultural entities and between urban and rural classes. Then, many leaders used intermediate leaders, like traditional chief or religious. They did not realize that empowering those individual educated in a feudal culture will conflict with the implementation of a modern state based on democracy and individual rights. Also, rewarding those intermediaries developed corruption because the needed resources were illegally extracted from the state's treasury. Such practices generated a progressive confusion between the coffers of the state and the leaders' wallets, and accelerated the destruction of economies already weakened by a lack of management skills. Additionally, it developed coteries more interested in what they could extract from the state because the survival in such political systems depends on the influence you acquire by distributing wealth.

To sum up, lack of vision, of ethics, and of managerial skills combined to empower feudal traditional or religious leaders, to develop a perceived relative deprivation that originated opposing armed or political movements, and generated challenging sub-state actors within the state. That failure in leadership originated the collapse of some states and is weakening others since the perpetual competition between those sub-state actors results a synergy that impediment the development of economic and political institutions.

Impact of the Outcomes

Thus, the recurrent pattern in the collapse or the weakening of the African state is the role played by influential individuals. They range from army leaders, guerrilla leaders to formerly exiled political leaders. Also some former members of weakening governments managed to get out of the state's apparatus before its collapse and postured themselves as democrats. Then, as the situation became ripe for change, they progressively get support from traditional chiefs, religious leaders or foreign powers and take power at the first trouble or election. That process is illustrated by the military coup of General Mainassara in Niger in 1996, the victory of Mathieu Kerekou by the polls in 1997 in Benin, the seizure of power by Laurent Desire Kabila in former Zaire in 1997 and the return of General Sassou Nguesso in Congo in 1998. None of the recent political mutations came from a popular or a class movement. The changes, being a state's collapse or stabilization were initiated and carried by sub-state actors.

Like the reviewed literature, this work's main purpose was to study what factors were crucial in the mutations occurring in today's African state. Understanding both the root causes and the current political, social economic, military, and diplomatic environment are imperative in establishing the legitimacy needed in any Security Assistance commitment. This thesis adds that sub-state actors are decisive points in planning Operations Other Than War or developing Internal

Security policies in the continent. As leaders of opinion, they are sensitive nodes for relaying information to the populations and collecting the kind of intelligence needed in non-traditional military operations. Also, their beliefs and behavior have strong influence on the agenda of any political leader.

However, as demonstrated in the analysis, modern state functions can not be left to feudal or religious sub-state actors. Empowering them will weaken the state and ignoring them will have a negative impact in the legitimacy of both domestic policies and assistance programs. “To shape a better environment, prevent conflicts or respond to crisis”¹⁰⁰ will always depend on how sub-state actors are managed in order to build or empower leadership at national level. As a consequence, it is imperative to study further topics in order to implement long-term strategies designed to progressively erode the influence of sub-state while using them in focused areas and at limited levels to fulfill intermediate objectives.

TOPICS FOR FURTHER STUDIES

1. How to manage sub-state actors in building leadership in Africa
2. What role for sub-state actors in the renewal of collapsed states?
3. How to integrate traditional and religious leaders in a modern democracy?

¹⁰⁰U.S. President. 1997. National Security Strategy of the United States. “*A National Security Strategy for a New Century.*” The White House, May 1997, 28.

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